# Round Report Vs. Pine Crest GJ

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**Discourse at the high school academic level uniquely key – leftist critique stagnates the US**

**Hanson 03**

**Victor Hanson (Professor Emeritus of Classics, California State), “The Fruits of Appeasement,” California State. 2003. Accessed 12/9/10.**[**http://city-journal.org/html/14\_2\_the\_fruits.html**](http://city-journal.org/html/14_2_the_fruits.html)

Rather than springing from realpolitik, sloth, or fear of oil cutoffs, much of our **appeasement of** Middle Eastern **terrorists derived from** a new sort of **anti-Americanism** that thrived in the growing therapeutic society of the 1980s and 1990s. Though the abrupt collapse of communism was a dilemma for the Left, it opened as many doors as it shut. To be sure, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, few Marxists could argue for a state-controlled economy or mouth the old romance about a workers’ paradise—not with scenes of East German families crammed into smoking clunkers lumbering over potholed roads, like American pioneers of old on their way west. But if the creed of the socialist republics was impossible to take seriously in either economic or political terms, such a collapse of doctrinaire statism did not discredit the gospel of forced egalitarianism and resentment against prosperous capitalists. Far from it. If Marx receded from economics departments, his spirit reemerged among our intelligentsia in the novel guises of post-structuralism, new historicism, multiculturalism, and all the other dogmas whose fundamental tenet was that white male capitalists had systematically oppressed women, minorities, and Third World people in countless insidious ways. The font of that collective oppression, both at home and abroad, was the rich, corporate, Republican, and white United States. The fall of the Soviet Union enhanced these newer post-colonial and liberation fields of study by immunizing their promulgators from charges of fellow-traveling or being dupes of Russian expansionism. Communism’s demise likewise freed these trendy ideologies from having to offer some wooden, unworkable Marxist alternative to the West; thus they could happily remain entirely critical, sarcastic, and cynical without any obligation to suggest something better, as witness the nihilist signs at recent protest marches proclaiming: “I Love Iraq, Bomb Texas.” **From writers like** Arundhati **Roy and** Michel **Foucault** (who anointed Khomeini “a kind of mystic saint” who would usher in a new “political spirituality” that would “transfigure” the world) and from old standbys like Frantz Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre (“to shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one stone, to destroy an oppressor and the man he oppresses at the same time”), **there filtered down a vague notion that the U**nited**S**tates **and the West in general were responsible for Third World misery** in ways that transcended the dull old class struggle. Endemic racism and the legacy of colonialism, the oppressive multinational corporation and the humiliation and erosion of indigenous culture brought on by globalization and a smug, self-important cultural condescension—all this and more explained poverty and despair, whether in Damascus, Teheran, or Beirut. [continues] This nonjudgmentalism—essentially a form of nihilism—deemed everything from Sudanese female circumcision to honor killings on the West Bank merely “different” rather than odious. Anyone who has taught freshmen at a state university can sense the fuzzy thinking of our undergraduates: **most come** to us **prepped in high schools not to make “value judgments” about “other” peoples who are** often **“victims” of American “oppression.”** Thus, **before female-hating psychopath Mohamed Atta piloted a jet into the World Trade Center, neither Western intellectuals nor their students would have taken him to task** for what he said or condemned him as hypocritical for his parasitical existence on Western society. **Instead,** without logic but **with plenty of romance, they would more likely have excused him as a victim of globalization or** of the biases of **American foreign policy**. They would have deconstructed Atta’s promotion of anti-Semitic, misogynist, Western-hating thought, as well as his conspiracies with Third World criminals, as anything but a danger anda pathology to be remedied by deportation or incarceration.

#### Heg solves war

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(Robert, Senior Associate – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “End of Dreams, Return of History: International Rivalry and American Leadership”, Policy Review, August/September, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html#n10)

The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying —  its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic. It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not only on the goodwill of peoples but also on American power. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War II would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe ’s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war. People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that ’s not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe. The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world ’s great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States. Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China ’s neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan. Conflicts are more likely to erupt if the United States withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene — even if it remained the world’s most powerful nation — could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore  to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe — if it adopted what some call a strategy of “offshore balancing” — this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable

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#### Violation:

A. “Cuba” does not include the Guantanamo base

CFR 6 – Code of Federal Regulations, 19CFR Ch. 1(4-1-06 Edition), p. 634

Subpart O—Flights to and From Cuba

§122.151 Definitions.

Under this subpart, the following definitions apply:

(a) United States. The term "U.S." includes the several States, the District of Columbia, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico.

(b) Cuba. The term "Cuba" does not include the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station.

**B. Economic engagement is a long-term strategy that promotes structural linkage between two economies – plan doesn’t do either**

**Mastanduno, 1** – professor of Government at Dartmouth College (Michael, “Economic Engagement Strategies: Theory and Practice” <http://web.archive.org/web/20120906033646/http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/bpollins/book/Mastanduno.pdf>

The basic causal logic of economic engagement, and the emphasis on domestic politics, can be traced to Hirschman. He viewed economic engagement as a **long-term, transformative strategy**. As one state gradually expands economic interaction with its target, the resulting (asymmetrical) interdependence creates vested interests within the target society and government. The beneficiaries of interdependence become addicted to it, and they protect their interests by pressuring the government to accommodate the source of interdependence. **Economic engagement is a form of structural linkage**; it is a means to get other states to *want* what you want, rather than to *do* what you want. The causal chain runs from economic interdependence through domestic political change to foreign policy accommodation.

**Good is not good enough – precise definition outweighs**

**Resnick 01** – Dr. Evan Resnick, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement”, Journal of International Affairs, Spring, 54(2), Ebsco

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a **precondition for effective policymaking**. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an **erratic, ad hoc fashion** risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error **undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research**. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they **undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy**.

## Framework

#### The affirmative must defend topical action its necessary to provide a point of stasis for debate preventing it from becoming mere statements such as racism is bad – the details and ways in which policies are enacted is far more important and thus a more revenant question to debate even if there is some value in the affirmative it is un-obtainable value to everyone but the affirmative because we prepare for the resolution – this year the resolution is that the United States federal government should substantially increase its economic engagements with Cuba, Mexico, or Venezuela – this provides a middle ground where we can have dialogue through discussion and debate about issues such as race and class and gender – the alternative is anarchy – the affirmative violates the resolution on multiple levels which is a prior question

Darin M. Maier, Director of Forensics, St. Andrew’s Episcopal School, 2012, “NFHS Policy Debate Topic Proposal: Latin America”, PDF, KENTUCKY

Proposed Resolutions 1. Resolved: the United States federal government should substantially change its diplomatic engagement with one or more of the following: Bolivia, Cuba, Venezuela. 2. Resolved: the United States federal government should substantially increase its economic engagement with one or more of the following: Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Venezuela. 3. Resolved: the United States federal government should substantially increase efforts to promote democracy in Latin America. 4. Resolved: the United States federal government should substantially change its foreign policy towards one of more of the following: Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Venezuela. 5. Resolved: the United States federal government should promote increased political stability in Latin America. 6. Resolved: the United States federal government should substantially change its foreign policy towards Latin America. Introduction After six decades of diminished political relevance, Latin America is in the midst of a fundamental transition. Once a place where the United States and Soviet Union conducted a proxy war between “our dictators” and “their dictators” with precious little concern for the citizens living there, Latin America is discovering its own voice and pursuing policies that serve its own citizens as opposed to some regional overlord. As the Brookings Institute noted in 2011, “Latin American countries have all moved in recent years, from different starting points, away from the extremes of unbridled capitalism on the one hand and state-run socialist economies on the other” (Lowenthal, www). Partially due to this, Latin America was able to avoid the worst effects of the global economic downturn that began in 2008, to the point where Russell Crandall observed in 2011 that “the region has entered into an era of unprecedented economic, political, and diplomatic success. Most visibly, Brazil has emerged as an economic powerhouse, attracting foreign investment with an economy that grew 7.5 percent last year” (84). More recently, though, the traditional economic challenges that all nations face are coming back to Latin America in general and Brazil in particular, where The Economist noted in their May 19 edition that “A reassessment of Brazil’s recent performance is overdue. Between 2000 and 2010 Brazil’s terms of trade improved by around 25%; in the past five years private-sector credit doubled. Such tailwinds cannot continue to blow – and even with them Brazil has grown on average by only 4.2% a year since 2006. Only productivity gains, and more savings and investment, can provide fresh puff. Those are nowhere to be seen: IPEA, a government-funded think-tank, puts annual productivity growth for the past decade at a paltry 0.9%, much of it from gains in agriculture. Investment is only around 19% of GDP. Add soaring labour costs and a still- strong currency, and many analysts are lowering their sights for potential annual growth to about 3.5%” These developments will create unique challenges for the United States going forward, at least in the near-term. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere was virtually unquestioned, the wistful dreams of Cuba’s Fidel Castro notwithstanding. However, “Latin American countries are increasingly looking for solutions among themselves, forming their own regional organizations, that exclude the United States and seeking friends and opportunities outside of Washington’s orbit” (Crandall 84). While it remains a pretty certain bet that the United States will retain a degree of influence in the Western Hemisphere, burgeoning global powers such as China, Japan, and Russia are beginning to establish economic and political beachheads in Latin America. Thus, the next few years are likely to be the most critical for our foreign policy choices in the region, as we are likely seeing the peak of American foreign policy efficacy in Latin America. It is the choices that we make sooner rather than later that will determine whether these nations choose to pursue a path of cooperation or confrontation with the United States and, in so doing, indicate the future effectiveness of American policy in the region. Timeliness Key Issues To a degree, a policy debate topic based on Latin America will always have some sense of timeliness about it, given the geographic proximity of the region to the United States. That having been said, right now there are a number of developments in Latin America that make it a particularly viable topic for academic debate right now. First, as mentioned above, the economic picture of Latin America is changing. In a grand irony, an area of the world that had long been considered economically troubled managed to avoid the economic downturn at the end of the last decade that engulfed so much of the rest of the world and is still causing notable trouble in places like the eurozone. In fact, economic growth in Latin America has been at a relatively vigorous clip (between 4 and 6 percent growth in real GDP) over the last decade. Two Latin American nations (Brazil and Mexico) are among the world’s twelve largest economies, and many economic prognosticators place Brazil on a path to be among the world’s five largest economies by the middle of this century. As such, those nations are now beginning to act more like modern economies and are feeling more pressure from the various factors that are determinative of economic success, as seen earlier in relation to Brazil. Additionally, while there has been notable economic growth in Latin America states, the benefits of that have yet to reach the bulk of their citizens, as evidenced by the Gini Index, as calculated by the World Bank. Of the nations included in the resolutions for which a Gini Index has been calculated, most have scores in the 50s, compared to 41 for the United States and levels in the mid-20s for many Scandinavian nations (the Gini Index measures the level of economic inequality in a nation, scaled from 0 to 100, with 0 indicating perfect income equality). Additionally on the economy, while the United States remains a key trading partner with Latin America, other nations are beginning to enter the scene with vigor and gusto. As Eric Farnsworth noted in an article from the February 2011 edition of Current History, “The US share of regional trade, meanwhile, is declining. From 2002 to 2008, the US share of exports from the region fell from 48 to 37 percent, while China’s grew from 4 to 10 percent. This trend is likely to continue, especially as China locks in trade agreements for the long term.” (58) One factor contributing to this trend is China’s practice of negotiating commercial deals as commercial deals only, in stark contrast to the American tendency to attach strings to such deals, usually related to issues such as political reform, democracy promotion, or the like. Finally on the economy, we should note the historical context mentioned previously. “Our dictators” tended to support authoritarian political systems with capitalist economies, while “their dictators” ran authoritarian states with centrally planned economies. When there was political change, either at the ballot box or the barrel of a weapon, that resulted in a regime one side or the other did not like, the immediate impulse was to destabilize and, if possible, remove that government from power. Covert activities by the United States in Argentina to remove Salvador Allende and in Nicaragua to defeat the Sandanista government are well-documented, as are Soviet attempts (primarily via Cuba) to support insurgencies against pro-American governments in Latin America, most notably El Salvador. However, as the Brookings Institute has observed regarding some of the previously left-leaning governments, ““the state ‘socialist’ ideological model, in short, is giving way in practice to an evolving attempt, different in each case, to combine the goals of social inclusion, community solidarity, and the integration of disadvantaged sectors with the use of capitalist instruments to expand economic growth.” (Lowenthal, www) This is even taking place in Cuba, where The Economist from March 24, 2012 noted that “Raul Castro... is trying to revive the island’s moribund economy by transferring a substantial chunk of it from state to private hands, with profound social and political implications.” (Special Report p.3) In contrast, other nations such as Argentina and Bolivia have made moves towards increasing nationalization of their economies, not to mention the transitions in Venezuela under Hugo Chavez. Simply put, on their own, the multidirectional economic transitions taking place in Latin America make this an opportune time for debate on this topic. Another reason why now is a most appropriate time to debate Latin America is indirectly related to some of the economic issues alluded to earlier in this section. Other major powers such as China, Japan, and Russia, have shown increasing interest in Latin America over the course of the last decade. While the early initiatives have been aimed principally at building economic relationships, it is not a significant stretch of the imagination to see how those relationships could develop a political character, which would necessarily challenge the perception, if not the reality, of American primacy in the area. Related to this has been the movement of Latin American nations themselves to create their own regional associations to address issues that are seen as their own, examples of such being MERCOSUR and the Union of South American Nations, both of which exclude the United States. Another example of this desire on the part of some Latin American nations to go their own way has been seen in their resistance to the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The FTAA, designed to reduce trade barriers among approximately three dozen Western Hemisphere nations, was not concluded by the initial deadline of 2005, resulting in the negotiation of a series of bilateral trade agreements and the proposal to hold a new round of negotiation, which was done last April at the Sixth Summit of the Americas, held in Cartagena, Colombia. However, no significant progress was made on the FTAA at the recent summit. This topic was last debated at the high school level during the 1987-1988 season. While elements of this topic were debated collegiately during the 1982-1983 (the resolution called for a prohibition on U.S. intervention into the affairs of Western Hemisphere nations) and 1999-2000 debate seasons (the resolution called for increased economic engagement with one of more of the governments of Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and North Korea), NDT has never debated Latin America as is being proposed here. Scope, Range, and Quality Because of its proximity to our border, Latin America will always be seen as an area of the world where the United States has a direct interest. Latin America has a total population of nearly 600 million people, including two of the earth’s eleven largest nations by population in Brazil and Mexico. Among these nations is found a wide range of ideologies in government. Conservative political forces currently lead the nations of Chile (Sebastián Piñera), Colombia (Juan Manuel Santos, who previously served as the Minister of Defense under Alvaro Uribe), and Mexico (Felipe Calderon). However, by the time this paper is discussed at the NFHS Topic Selection, Calderon’s National Action Party (PAN) will likely have lost the presidency as Mexico holds a general election on July 1, with polls indicating the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) candidate comfortably in the lead. Among left-leaning parties, there is a clear distinction to be drawn between more moderate governments (e.g. Brazil under the leadership of Dilma Rousseff of the social democratic Workers’ Party) and what the literature refers to as the “contestatory left”, generally measured by the degree of cooperation between the particular government and the United States. The governments of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, the Castros in Cuba, and Evo Morales in Bolivia would most naturally fall under the latter category. The significance of this is that even in interactions with the left-leaning governments, a “one size fits all” approach, similar to the practice of American foreign policy during the Cold War, is unlikely to be successful across the board and would have definite implications for relations between those nations, particularly if the resolution uses “Latin America” as opposed to identifying individual nations for inclusion in the topic area as was done on the military deployment topic in 2010-2011. The proximity of this relationship manifests itself in the significant amount of trade taking place between the United States and the rest of the Western Hemisphere. Assistant Secretary of State Arturo Valenzuela testified before Congress “in 2009, total U.S. merchandise trade between the U.S. and Latin America and the Caribbean reached $524 billion and 40 percent of Latin America and the Caribbean’s exports flowed to the United States, making us the region’s single largest export destination. The Western Hemisphere, including Canada, absorbs 42 percent of U.S. exports and total trade with the hemisphere reached $1.5 trillion in 2009” (Valenzuela, www). The geographic closeness is also apparent in the level of immigration between the Latin America to the United States, although some recent literature indicates that there may be now a rough balance between the number of immigrants coming to the United States and those returning to their home countries. Additionally, there also appears to be this perception a Latin American nations have been perpetually impoverished and remain so in the present day. That view is empirically false, as evidenced by the United Nations Development Programme. According to that organization’s Human Development Index (HDI), every Latin American nation (with the exception of Haiti) is categorized as possessing an HDI score indicating at least medium human development, with Chile and Argentina characterized as having a very high level of human development. When looking at per capita Gross Domestic Product (adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity), nations such as Russia and Turkey can be found in the same range as the Latin American nations of Chile and Mexico while Iran is only marginally ahead of Brazil (CIA, www). However, the benefits of the economic growth have yet to lift all boats in Latin America and there are some questions about whether this growth will be sustainable in the years to come. Clearly, the range of available cases on this topic will depend some on the precise wording of the resolution. A broader resolution, such as Proposed Resolution 6, is virtually boundless in the sort of plans that could potentially be topical, thus increasing the role that the word “substantially” would play as a limiting agent for the resolution. Admittedly, that is likely to initially increase the number of times negative teams will be forced to go for topicality early in the season as a way to combat affirmative plans that push the envelope. Proposed resolutions 2 and 4 are much more limited. In making the suggestion on what countries to include or exclude, this paper includes my thoughts on several candidate nations, an approach similar to that used on the Military Deployments topic paper. Argentina – Not Included. Despite the fact that Argentina is one of the larger nations both in terms of population and economic power, relations between the United States and Argentina have been relatively uneventful. This coupled with the fact that Argentina lacks the power of a Brazil or Mexico in the region would seem to increase the difficulty of finding specific solvency evidence to support policy approaches. Bolivia – Included. After years of steps to diminish production, coca began to return as a significant crop with the election of President Evo Morales, who had been heavily involved with the coca economy prior to his election as president. This, in addition to the left-leaning government of Morales, provides an interesting intersection of policy challenges for the United States which would render it suitable for academic debate. Additionally, with a population that is over half Amerindian and the acceptance of approximately three dozen indigenous languages that are recognized as official in Bolivia, it would seem that affirmative teams would have little trouble crafting advantage scenarios calling for the protection of indigenous populations in that country. Brazil – Included. In terms of both population (192 million) and Gross Domestic Product ($2.3 trillion, in PPP terms), it is quite difficult to exclude Brazil from any serious discussion of Latin American policy, unless a resolution focuses on those nations more antagonistic to the United States (Bolivia, Cuba, Venezuela). In fact, a good portion of the topic literature uses Brazil as a case study when examining the differences between moderate and contestatory left governments. Further, Brazil (along with Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico) has been identified by Conservation International as a “megadiverse country”, opening up a range of cases based on various environmental impacts. Additionally, past president Luiz Inácio Lula de Silva did receive a significant measure of press coverage in Brazil, including a relatively recent feature on him on the CBS program 60 Minutes, so debaters should have little problem developing enough of an understanding about Brazil to create intelligent arguments. Chile – Not included. While the election of Sebastián Piñera gives Chile an elected right- leaning government, in contrast to most other Latin American nations, it does seem to create a challenge in an academic debate context. Because Chile is one of the more pro- United States governments in Latin America, a lot of potential issues are likely to be addressed between the two nations without a lot of controversy, which may make it difficult to find good harms evidence for affirmative plans. While it could be argued that Chile might be able to be used by the United States to exert leverage in the region, this depends on the relationship that Chile has with other Latin American nations. As an aside, it is interesting to note that Chile, according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, is seen as slightly less corrupt than the United States and considerably more honest in its governance than nearly all other Latin American nations. (www) Colombia – Included. While Colombia’s struggles to control drug production and trade within would likely be enough to merit inclusion in the resolution, there have also been efforts to control terrorism in Colombia where American assistance might provide fertile ground for both affirmative and negative teams to find evidence and create arguments. More specifically, 2011 saw a shift in tactics and an increase in insurgent activity on the part of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Above and beyond that, Colombia has become the 4th largest oil producer in Latin America, now producing around one million barrels daily, helping to establish the country as part of the CIVETS (Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, South Africa) group of emerging markets. Cuba – Included. Similar to the drug trade with Colombia, there is a wealth of discussion on the issue of the Castro brothers and their leadership of Cuba that would be enough by itself to merit inclusion into the resolution. However, beyond that there is the fact that Cuba’s population of 11 million makes it the largest nation in the Caribbean. Additionally, as the only nation to meet the World Wildlife Fund’s guidelines for sustainable development, one might be able to craft cases using this framework to generate significant advantages regarding the environment. Of course, there will also be the option to run cases that propose to change or eliminate the embargo on the island nation. Finally, since Cuba has been such a focus of U.S. foreign policy in Latin America over the last half-century, finding literature will definitely not be a problem. Ecuador – Not included. While there have been some issues in the relationship between the governments of the United States and Ecuador (the debt default of 2008, the decision of President Rafael Correa not to renew the United States’ lease of Eloy Air Base in 2009, and the expulsion of the U.S. Ambassador to Ecuador in 2011, reciprocated in kind by the United States), it would be hard to build advantage scenarios around these issues that would be likely to outweigh negative disadvantages. Additionally, the likely cases that involve Ecuador likely would depend on the United States advancing some sort of quid pro quo to achieve the desired reaction from Ecuador, for which solvency advocates would likely be difficult to find. Mexico – Included. Like Brazil, Mexico’s population (112 million) and Gross Domestic Product (approximately $1.6 trillion in PPP terms) make it difficult to exclude in most attempts to craft a topic related to Latin America. Additionally, because of the shared border, issues such as immigration and drug trafficking will have a more direct effect on the United States. Beyond that, there is the added advantage that while novices may not know much about some of the countries on this list at the start of the season, all are likely to know enough about Mexico to be able to say something and craft arguments around issues in the Mexican-U.S. relationship. Venezuela – Included. While not as large as Brazil or Mexico, Venezuela does have some other intriguing features that make it worthy of inclusion. First is its president. Simply put, Venezuela’s leader Hugo Chávez seems to have appointed himself the mantle of being the main irritant to the United States in Latin America. As a result, cases that involve engaging this nation would require a bit of finesse in terms of crafting policy likely to be effective. Additionally, Venezuela is one of only two OPEC members located in the Western Hemisphere, which provides an additional angle that the other nations lack. Venezuela is also considered to be the classic case of a contestatory left government in Latin America, which serves as a good counterexample to nations such as Brazil. Finally, it is worth noting that Venezuela and Iran have some mutual ties, as evidenced by the visit of Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Venezuela in January 2012 (this is actually one of several visits between Iranian and Venezuelan leaders, as Mohammed Khatami made three trips to Venezuela during his tenure as Iran’s president). While this would require some deeper investigation, there may be the potential to craft harms scenarios where Venezuela is used as a diplomatic lever against Iran. More recently (in fact, between the submission of the preliminary and final drafts of this paper), reports have surfaced that Chavez may be dealing with end-stage colon cancer and may not survive his campaign to win reelection in October. However, it also must be noted that this particular report is unconfirmed by Venezuelan officials and was based on a single source close to Chavez. One benefit of a Latin America resolution is that novice debaters are likely to already possess a level of familiarity with some parts of the topical ground. For example, incoming debaters who have paid even a cursory glance at CNN, the New York Times, or a major news magazine are likely to have at least heard some about Cuba-U.S. relations, the drug-related violence that has engulfed Mexico (and involved the Mexican armed forces as an active combatant since 2006), Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, and the prominence of the environment. Varsity debaters should find issues such as the rights of indigenous peoples, the efficacy of state versus non-state action, and deeper discussions of environmental issues of sufficient interest to generate educational and interesting debates. Harms Areas Latin America offers a significant number of argument areas to the debater willing to seek them out, with many able to be employed on either the affirmative or the negative side of the debate. What follows is in no way intended to be an exhaustive list, but available harms areas include the following: Capitalism – given the number of countries in Latin America (eight as of April 2012) that are members of ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas – a collection of states with socialist-leaning economies), the debate between capitalist and non-capitalist oriented solutions to policy problems is one that can actually be examined with some measure of empirical evidence. This will support the ability of teams to address the kritiks of capitalism from either side of the debate. Additionally, affirmative or negative teams should also be able to craft arguments that the adherence to the capitalist model inhibits the efficacy of the United States to engage other nations in the Western Hemisphere on key issues such as environmental protection and trade. China – The question of China fits into a picture involving the foreign and trade policies of Latin America will provide a basis for advantages, disadvantages, and counterplans. A number of authors have been examining the increased role that China is playing in Latin America. As noted by Farnsworth above, some Latin American nations prefer trade with China to the United States given China’s preference to keep commercial and political relationships more compartmentalized than the United States typically does. This increased role of China in Latin America has also been mentioned by former National Security Advisor Zbiginew Brzezinski, where he writes, “In that context, China could also begin to play a more significant role in the post-American regional politics of the Western Hemisphere. As part of China’s slowly emerging campaign for greater global influence, the PRC has initiated large-scale investments in both Africa and Latin America. For example, Brazil and China have long been trying to forge a strategic partnership in energy and technology. This is not to suggest that China would seek to dominate this region, but it obviously could benefit from receding American power, by helping more overtly anti-American governments in their economic development.” (108) In essence, were China able to secure its economic beachhead in the Western Hemisphere, it would certainly challenge U.S. economic supremacy and would provide the support that Latin American nations may need to develop the backbone to tell the United States “no” as it regards to various issues within the hemisphere. Additionally, there is also the distinct possibility that the United States would attempt to play a “tit- for-tat” game and respond to China’s movements in the West by responses in eastern Asia, creating the potential for conflict and miscalculation. Democracy Promotion – For decades, democracy promotion, or at least the claim of engaging in democracy promotion, has been a central feature of American foreign policy, particularly during the Cold War. Teams will certainly be able to question whether or not that focus on democracy promotion is beneficial. Beyond that, the rights-based orientation of Western notions of democracy can serve as the basis for kritiks such as Orientalism or other arguments based on cultural imperialism. Drugs – The efforts on the part of the Mexican government in recent years to control flaring drug cartel violence serve as a reminder that Latin America has a decades-long history of being involved in drug production and trafficking. Impact scenarios here include the economic impacts of drug use, the rise of criminal networks (including the development of narco-terrorism), and the destabilization of governments. Negative teams do have the opportunity to run counterplans to legalize or decriminalize drugs, which could generate traction against “drug war” affirmatives. Environment – There are several possible scenarios in play here. With six nations identified as “megadiverse countries” by Conversation International, Latin America has a larger portion of such nations than any other region of the world. Arguments about keystone species, speculations on the possibility of undiscovered medicines, and the like will certainly have sufficient evidentiary support to develop advantages. Beyond the biodiversity angle, there are other issues that merit investigation, including renewable energy. As the online publication Renewable Energy World noted, “Brazil...has laid the groundwork to becoming an international force in wind energy. But the country has been a non-player in the solar industry with just one 1MW solar project under its belt. Now, the state government appears to be ready to make a major investment in the solar industry. According to Bloomberg News, Brazil’s state-run energy agency is set to introduce two significant policies that would allow utilities to receive tax breaks for large-scale projects and would let businesses and consumers sell electricity back into the grid.” (“Latin America Report”, www) Chile has already moved further along the solar road, as observed by Amanda Maxwell, Latin America Advocate of the National Resources Defense Council: Chile is increasingly tapping into solar energy. Solar energy is now powering schools, clinics, farms, tunnels, residential lighting systems and even neighborhoods in the Atacama region. In addition, six new photovoltaic systems totaling 706 megawatts recently began the environmental review process. (“Latin America Report”, www) As far as destruction of the Amazon Rainforest, teams may face tougher sledding. Amazon deforestation rates have been on a significant and general decline since 2004 (there was a slight increase in the deforestation rate in 2008) and was at its lowest level in 2011. As the BBC noted on January 1 of this year, “In the decade between 1996 and 2005, 19,500 sq km (7,530 sq miles) of jungle was lost on average every single year. The comparison is overused, but that really is an area about the size of Wales or New Jersey each year. It reached a peak in 2004 when more than 27,000 sq km was lost.Then, in 2004 Brazil declared war - it said it would cut deforestation by 80% by 2020. Seven years later and it has almost reached its goal. The latest figures, released just weeks ago, show that 2011 had the lowest rates of deforestation since records began three decades ago - just over 6,200 sq km was cut. That's 78% down on 2004, still a lot of trees - an area the about the size of Devon, or Delaware - but a huge improvement.” (Rowlatt, www) On the other hand, global warming remains a viable impact scenario for this topic. The Google search “Latin America global warming” returned over 16,000,000 hits. While the reduction in Amazon deforestation and emerging interest in sustainable energy may help to reduce the pace of global warming, a lot of attention was directed at the results of the June 2012 Rio+20 Earth Summit, held in Rio de Janeiro. It is entirely likely that this conference will generate new policy proposals for the United States to consider going forward. Hegemony – For decades, the United States’ role as the dominant player in the Western Hemisphere was largely unquestioned. Now that the Cold War has been in our rearview mirror for some two decades, the world has more closely looked at whether our foreign policy actions are in accordance with what are typically American goals in diplomacy, such as increased democratization, economic liberalization, and freer trade. While still an essential actor in that region, other nations such as China, Japan, and Russia (particularly China, as evidenced above) have begun to develop their own relationships in Latin America which will serve to generate leverage against American ambitions in the Western Hemisphere. How the United States engages those challenges in the near term will determine our position in the world both in the short and long term. If the United States can retain its position in the Western Hemisphere and maintain a spirit of cooperation in the region, Latin American nations may be more likely to work hand in glove with the United States to address problems. Indigenous People – The estimated indigenous population in the Western Hemisphere is between 40 and 50 million. While most have been integrated at some level into the culture or government of the country where they live, a few are still considered to be uncontacted peoples, whose precise status depends on where they reside. Affirmatives may seek advantages based on domestic modeling of foreign policy pressures placed on nations regarding their indigenous populations. Teams could also try to craft advantages related to the preservation of these cultures as being an important step towards preventing cultural genocide elsewhere. One particular group that affirmatives may look at are the Amerindians in Mexico linked to the Zapatista movement that was involved in armed conflict in the state of Chiapas during the mid-1990s. Mexican Nationalism – The essential story behind this argument could go one of two ways: due to either Mexico becoming less dependent on the United States or increasingly frustrated with American meddling in their affairs, a more vigorous and antagonistic blend of nationalism emerges in Mexico, leading to cross-border conflict with the United States. Addressing one of these scenarios, former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski writes: In the longer run, the potential worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents. Political and economic realities have forced Mexicans to sublimate historical memories of territory lost to the United States for the sake of more beneficial relations with the most powerful state in the Western Hemisphere and (later) the sole global superpower. But in a world where Mexico did not count as much on a weakened United States, incidents resulting initially from the cross-border narcotics trade could easily escalate into armed clashes. One could even imagine cross-border raids made under the banner of “recovery” of historically Mexican soil; there are historical precedents for such a transformation of banditry into a patriotic cause. An additional and convenient pretext could be the notion that anti-immigrant sentiment in the United States is tantamount to discrimination, thus requiring retaliatory acts. These in turn could lead to the argument that the presence of many Mexicans on the formerly Mexican territory raises the issue of territorial self-determination.” (108-109) Trade -- This particular aspect of U.S. relations with Latin America is undergoing some change, as China’s entry into the market here has been noted above. Additionally, as noted previously, the United States has pushed for the creation of the FTAA for at some level since 1994, but has been unable to muster the support from Latin American nations necessary to institute this organization. The most recent failure came at the Sixth Summit of the Americas last April, which became more well-known for the extracurricular activities of the Secret Service than any substantial policy achievements. Affirmatives could put forth plans that address the primary objections of Latin America to the FTAA, paving the way for acceptance and implementation. Additionally, affirmatives could propose some other sort of broad based change, such as fundamental amendments to the trade relationships promulgated under either NAFTA or CAFTA. Finally, it is worth keeping in mind that if Cuba becomes one of the topic nations, a whole range of plans related to the U.S. embargo (which turned 50 this past February) would be in play, ranging from a tightening of the embargo to its total abolition. A couple of impact scenarios come to mind right away: one that involves the U.S. being able to access the resources of nations such as Venezuela when relations are normalized between the United States and Cuba and another that involves the outbreak of a trade war between China and the United States that ultimately descends into a military conflict. Definitions change “make or become different”. Oxford Online Dictionary “to cause to be different”. American Heritage Online Dictionary democracy “rule by the people”. Britannica Online Encyclopedia “Government by the people, exercised either directly or through elected representatives”. American Heritage Online Dictionary diplomatic “of or concerning the profession, activity, or skill of managing international relations”. Oxford Dictionaries Online economic engagement According to Miles Kahler and Scott Kastner, economic engagement is defined as “a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an adversary in order to change the behavior of the target state and effect an improvement in bilateral political relations” (www) The basic causal logic of economic engagement, and the emphasis on domestic politics, can be traced to Hirschman. He viewed economic engagement as a long-term, transformative strategy. As one state gradually expands economic interaction with its target, the resulting (asymmetrical) interdependence creates vested interests within the target society and government. The beneficiaries of interdependence become addicted to it, and they protect their interests by pressuring the government to accommodate the source of interdependence. Economic engagement is a form of structural linkage; it is a means to get other states to want what you want, rather than to do what you want. The causal chain runs from economic interdependence through domestic political change to foreign policy accommodation. (Mastanduno, www) foreign policy “The diplomatic policy of a nation in its interactions with other nations”. American Heritage Online Dictionary increase “Plan of action adopted by one nation in regards to its diplomatic dealings with other countries. Foreign policies are established as a systematic way to deal with issues that may arise with other countries”. Businessdictionary.com “become or make greater in size, amount, intensity, or degree”. Oxford Online Dictionary “to become greater or larger” American Heritage Online Dictionary Latin America promote “to contribute to the growth or prosperity of”. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary “To contribute to the progress or growth of; further”. American Heritage Online Dictionary should “used to indicate obligation, duty, or correctness, typically when criticizing someone’s actions”. Oxford Online Dictionary “used to express obligation or duty”. American Heritage Online Dictionary stability “The state or quality of being stable, especially: a. Resistance to change, deterioration, or displacement. b. Constancy of character or purpose; steadfastness. c. Reliability; dependability.” American Heritage Online Dictionary “The state of being stable”. Oxford Online Dictionary substantially Note – as anyone who has coached or debated will know, several legal definitions exist that assign a percentage to this term. However, those definitions are often, by their context, limited to addressing the issue that was at bar. Thus, while a list of cases could cite substantially as meaning anything from 10 percent up to 90 percent, I will refrain from listing them here. “to a great or significant extent”. Oxford Online Dictionary “considerable in importance, value, degree, amount, or extent”. American Heritage Online Dictionary “The countries of the Western Hemisphere south of the United States, especially those speaking Spanish, Portuguese, or French”. American Heritage Online Dictionary “Latin America is generally understood to consist of the entire continent of South America in addition to Mexico, Central America, and the islands of the Caribbean whose inhabitants speak a Romance language.” Encyclopedia Britannica Online towards “as regards, in relation to”. Oxford Online Dictionary “in the direction of”. American Heritage Online Dictionary United States federal government “The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary.” US Legal.com Definitions “The government of the United States, established by the Constitution, is a federal republic of 50 states, a few territories and some protectorates. The national government consists of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches.” Word IQ.com

#### Prefer our interpretation:

#### Fairness – a point of stasis is necessary to fairness and reciprocity – otherwise the debate is meaningless non-sense we have nothing to say

Shively ‘2K (Ruth Lessl, Assistant Prof Political Science – Texas A&M U., Partisan Politics and Political Theory, p. 181-2)

The requirements given thus far are primarily negative. The ambiguists must say "no" to-they must reject and limit-some ideas and actions. In what follows, we will also find that they must say "yes" to some things. In particular, they must say "yes" to the idea of rational persuasion. This means, first, that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is necessary to discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake is in thinking that agreement marks the end of contest-that consensus kills debate. But this is true only if the agreement is perfect-if there is nothing at all left to question or contest. In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. We agree on some matters but not on others, on generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications, and so on. And this kind of limited agreement is the *starting* condition of contest and debate. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. There can be no argument except on the premise, and within a context, of agreement. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, we cannot argue about something if we are not communicating: if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one's target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Resisters, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or the terms of their disagreements. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator's audience must know what is being resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words, contestation rests on some basic agreement or harmony. But, again, the response to the ambiguist must be that the practice of questioning and undermining rules, like all other social practices, needs a certain order. The subversive needs rules to protect subversion. And when we look more closely at the rules protective of subversion, we find that they are roughly the rules of argument discussed above. In fact, the rules of argument are roughly the rules of democracy or civility: the delineation of boundaries necessary to protect speech and action from violence, manipulation, and other forms of tyranny.

#### The second impact is Dialogue – it is the biggest impact and precedes discussions of truth claims because we must have something to debate against before we debate against it – only effective dialogue can allow us to engage in the affirmative

Morson 4 http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/0521831059.pdf#page=331 Northwestern Professor, Prof. Morson's work ranges over a variety of areas: literary theory (especially narrative); the history of ideas, both Russian and European; a variety of literary genres (especially satire, utopia, and the novel); and his favorite writers -- Chekhov, Gogol, and, above all, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. He is especially interested in the relation of literature to philosophy.

A belief in truly dialogic ideological becoming would lead to schools that were quite different. In such schools, the mind would be populated with a complexity of voices and perspectives it had not known, and the student would learn to think with those voices, to test ideas and experiences against them, and to shape convictions that are innerly persuasive in response. This very process would be central. Students would sense that whatever word they believed to be innerly persuasive was only tentatively so: the process of dialogue continues.We must keep the conversation going, and formal education only initiates the process. The innerly persuasive discourse would not be final, but would be, like experience itself, ever incomplete and growing. As Bakhtin observes of the innerly persuasive word: Its creativity and productiveness consist precisely in the fact that such a word awakens new and independent words, that it organizes masses of our words from within, and does not remain in an isolated and static condition. It is not so much interpreted by us as it is further, that is, freely, developed, applied to new material, new conditions; it enters into interanimating relationships with new contexts. . . . The semantic structure of an innerly persuasive discourse is not finite, it is open; in each of the new contexts that dialogize it, this discourse is able to reveal ever newer ways to mean. (DI, 345–6) We not only learn, we also learn to learn, and we learn to learn best when we engage in a dialogue with others and ourselves. We appropriate the world of difference, and ourselves develop new potentials. Those potentials allow us to appropriate yet more voices. Becoming becomes endless becoming. We talk, we listen, and we achieve an open-ended wisdom. Difference becomes an opportunity (see Freedman and Ball, this volume). Our world manifests the spirit that Bakhtin attributed to Dostoevsky: “nothing conclusive has yet taken place in the world, the ultimate word of the world and about the world has not yet been spoken, the world is open and free, everything is in the future and will always be in the future.”3 Such a world becomes our world within, its dialogue lives within us, and we develop the potentials of our ever-learning selves. Letmedraw some inconclusive conclusions, which may provoke dialogue. Section I of this volume, “Ideologies in Dialogue: Theoretical Considerations” and Bakhtin’s thought in general suggest that we learn best when we are actually learning to learn. We engage in dialogue with ourselves and others, and the most important thing is the value of the open-ended process itself. Section II, “Voiced, Double Voiced, and Multivoiced Discourses in Our Schools” suggests that a belief in truly dialogic ideological becoming would lead to schools that were quite different. In such schools, the mind would be populated with a complexity of voices and perspectives it had not known, and the student would learn to think with those voices, to test ideas and experiences against them, and to shape convictions that are innerly persuasive in response. Teachers would not be trying to get students to hold the right opinions but to sense the world from perspectives they would not have encountered or dismissed out of hand. Students would develop the habit of getting inside the perspectives of other groups and other people. Literature in particular is especially good at fostering such dialogic habits. Section III, “Heteroglossia in a Changing World” may invite us to learn that dialogue involves really listening to others, hearing them not as our perspective would categorize what they say, but as they themselves would categorize what they say, and only then to bring our own perspective to bear. We talk, we listen, and we achieve an open-ended wisdom. The chapters in this volume seem to suggest that we view learning as a perpetual process. That was perhaps Bakhtin’s favorite idea: that to appreciate life, or dialogue, we must see value not only in achieving this or that result, but also in recognizing that honest and open striving in a world of uncertainty and difference is itself the most important thing. What we must do is keep the conversation going.

#### Governmental Engagement – key to develop life skills that can change the world – pre-conceived notions means it doesn’t trade-off with conviction

Esberg & Sagan 12 \*Jane Esberg is special assistant to the director at New York University's Center on. International Cooperation. She was the winner of 2009 Firestone Medal, AND \*\*Scott Sagan is a professor of political science and director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation “NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy,” 2/17 The Nonproliferation Review, 19:1, 95-108

These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis\*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts\*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7 By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave and how their own government works.8 Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.’’11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts\* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.14

#### AND - Linking the ballot to a should question in combination with USFG simulation teaches the skills to organize pragmatic consequences and philosophical values into a course of action

Hanghoj 8 http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008 Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant professor.

Joas’ re-interpretation of Dewey’s pragmatism as a “theory of situated creativity” raises a critique of humans as purely rational agents that navigate instrumentally through meansends- schemes (Joas, 1996: 133f). This critique is particularly important when trying to understand how games are enacted and validated within the realm of educational institutions that by definition are inscribed in the great modernistic narrative of “progress” where nation states, teachers and parents expect students to acquire specific skills and competencies (Popkewitz, 1998; cf. chapter 3). However, as Dewey argues, the actual doings of educational gaming cannot be reduced to rational means-ends schemes. Instead, the situated interaction between teachers, students, and learning resources are played out as contingent re-distributions of means, ends and ends in view, which often make classroom contexts seem “messy” from an outsider’s perspective (Barab & Squire, 2004). 4.2.3. Dramatic rehearsal The two preceding sections discussed how Dewey views play as an imaginative activity of educational value, and how his assumptions on creativity and playful actions represent a critique of rational means-end schemes. For now, I will turn to Dewey’s concept of dramatic rehearsal, which assumes that social actors deliberate by projecting and choosing between various scenarios for future action. Dewey uses the concept dramatic rehearsal several times in his work but presents the most extensive elaboration in Human Nature and Conduct: Deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing possible lines of action… [It] is an experiment in finding out what the various lines of possible action are really like (...) Thought runs ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby avoids having to await the instruction of actual failure and disaster. An act overtly tried out is irrevocable, its consequences cannot be blotted out. An act tried out in imagination is not final or fatal. It is retrievable (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This excerpt illustrates how Dewey views the process of decision making (deliberation) through the lens of an imaginative drama metaphor. Thus, decisions are made through the imaginative projection of outcomes, where the “possible competing lines of action” are resolved through a thought experiment. Moreover, Dewey’s compelling use of the drama metaphor also implies that decisions cannot be reduced to utilitarian, rational or mechanical exercises, but that they have emotional, creative and personal qualities as well. Interestingly, there are relatively few discussions within the vast research literature on Dewey of his concept of dramatic rehearsal. A notable exception is the phenomenologist Alfred Schütz, who praises Dewey’s concept as a “fortunate image” for understanding everyday rationality (Schütz, 1943: 140). Other attempts are primarily related to overall discussions on moral or ethical deliberation (Caspary, 1991, 2000, 2006; Fesmire, 1995, 2003; Rönssön, 2003; McVea, 2006). As Fesmire points out, dramatic rehearsal is intended to describe an important phase of deliberation that does not characterise the whole process of making moral decisions, which includes “duties and contractual obligations, short and long-term consequences, traits of character to be affected, and rights” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Instead, dramatic rehearsal should be seen as the process of “crystallizing possibilities and transforming them into directive hypotheses” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Thus, deliberation can in no way guarantee that the response of a “thought experiment” will be successful. But what it can do is make the process of choosing more intelligent than would be the case with “blind” trial-and-error (Biesta, 2006: 8). The notion of dramatic rehearsal provides a valuable perspective for understanding educational gaming as a simultaneously real and imagined inquiry into domain-specific scenarios. Dewey defines dramatic rehearsal as the capacity to stage and evaluate “acts”, which implies an “irrevocable” difference between acts that are “tried out in imagination” and acts that are “overtly tried out” with real-life consequences (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This description shares obvious similarities with games as they require participants to inquire into and resolve scenario-specific problems (cf. chapter 2). On the other hand, there is also a striking difference between moral deliberation and educational game activities in terms of the actual consequences that follow particular actions. Thus, when it comes to educational games, acts are both imagined and tried out, but without all the real-life consequences of the practices, knowledge forms and outcomes that are being simulated in the game world. Simply put, there is a difference in realism between the dramatic rehearsals of everyday life and in games, which only “play at” or simulate the stakes and risks that characterise the “serious” nature of moral deliberation, i.e. a real-life politician trying to win a parliamentary election experiences more personal and emotional risk than students trying to win the election scenario of The Power Game. At the same time, the lack of real-life consequences in educational games makes it possible to design a relatively safe learning environment, where teachers can stage particular game scenarios to be enacted and validated for educational purposes. In this sense, educational games are able to provide a safe but meaningful way of letting teachers and students make mistakes (e.g. by giving a poor political presentation) and dramatically rehearse particular “competing possible lines of action” that are relevant to particular educational goals (Dewey, 1922: 132). Seen from this pragmatist perspective, the educational value of games is not so much a question of learning facts or giving the “right” answers, but more a question of exploring the contingent outcomes and domain-specific processes of problem-based scenarios.

#### AND – Switch Side Debate – only a set of affirmation and negation allows for a switch side model that fosters effective deliberation – it allows for better critical thinking and advocacy that fosters stronger defense of one’s convictions

Keller, et. al, 01 – Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago (Thomas E., James K., and Tracly K., Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago, professor of Social Work, and doctoral student School of Social Work, “Student debates in policy courses: promoting policy practice skills and knowledge through active learning,” Journal of Social Work Education, Spr/Summer 2001, EBSCOhost)

SOCIAL WORKERS HAVE a professional responsibility to shape social policy and legislation (National Association of Social Workers, 1996). In recent decades, the concept of policy practice has encouraged social workers to consider the ways in which their work can be advanced through active participation in the policy arena (Jansson, 1984, 1994; Wyers, 1991). The emergence of the policy practice framework has focused greater attention on the competencies required for social workers to influence social policy and placed greater emphasis on preparing social work students for policy intervention (Dear & Patti, 1981; Jansson, 1984, 1994; Mahaffey & Hanks, 1982; McInnis-Dittrich, 1994). The curriculum standards of the Council on Social Work Education (CSWE) require the teaching of knowledge and skills in the political process (CSWE, 1994). With this formal expectation of policy education in schools of social work, the best instructional methods must be employed to ensure students acquire the requisite policy practice skills and perspectives. The authors believe that structured student debates have great potential for promoting competence in policy practice and in-depth knowledge of substantive topics relevant to social policy. Like other interactive assignments designed to more closely resemble "real-world" activities, issue-oriented debates actively engage students in course content. Debates also allow students to develop and exercise skills that may translate to political activities, such as testifying before legislative committees. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, debates may help to stimulate critical thinking by shaking students free from established opinions and helping them to appreciate the complexities involved in policy dilemmas. Relationships between Policy Practice Skills, Critical Thinking, and Learning Policy practice encompasses social workers' "efforts to influence the development, enactment, implementation, or assessment of social policies" (Jansson, 1994, p. 8). Effective policy practice involves analytic activities, such as defining issues, gathering data, conducting research, identifying and prioritizing policy options, and creating policy proposals (Jansson, 1994). It also involves persuasive activities intended to influence opinions and outcomes, such as discussing and debating issues, organizing coalitions and task forces, and providing testimony. According to Jansson (1984,pp. 57-58), social workers rely upon five fundamental skills when pursuing policy practice activities: value-clarification skills for identifying and assessing the underlying values inherent in policy positions; conceptual skills for identifying and evaluating the relative merits of different policy options; interactional skills for interpreting the values and positions of others and conveying one's own point of view in a convincing manner; political skills for developing coalitions and developing effective strategies; and position-taking skills for recommending, advocating, and defending a particular policy. These policy practice skills reflect the hallmarks of critical thinking (see Brookfield, 1987; Gambrill, 1997). The central activities of critical thinking are identifying and challenging underlying assumptions, exploring alternative ways of thinking and acting, and arriving at commitments after a period of questioning, analysis, and reflection (Brookfield, 1987). Significant parallels exist with the policy-making process--identifying the values underlying policy choices, recognizing and evaluating multiple alternatives, and taking a position and advocating for its adoption. Developing policy practice skills seems to share much in common with developing capacities for critical thinking. R.W. Paul (as cited in Gambrill, 1997) states that critical thinkers acknowledge the imperative to argue from opposing points of view and to seek to identify weakness and limitations in one's own position. Critical thinkers are aware that there are many legitimate points of view, each of which (when thought through) may yield some level of insight. (p. 126) John Dewey, the philosopher and educational reformer, suggested that the initial advance in the development of reflective thought occurs in the transition from holding fixed, static ideas to an attitude of doubt and questioning engendered by exposure to alternative views in social discourse (Baker, 1955, pp. 36-40). Doubt, confusion, and conflict resulting from discussion of diverse perspectives "force comparison, selection, and reformulation of ideas and meanings" (Baker, 1955, p. 45). Subsequent educational theorists have contended that learning requires openness to divergent ideas in combination with the ability to synthesize disparate views into a purposeful resolution (Kolb, 1984; Perry, 1970). On the one hand, clinging to the certainty of one's beliefs risks dogmatism, rigidity, and the inability to learn from new experiences. On the other hand, if one's opinion is altered by every new experience, the result is insecurity, paralysis, and the inability to take effective action. The educator's role is to help students develop the capacity to incorporate new and sometimes conflicting ideas and experiences into a coherent cognitive framework. Kolb suggests that, "if the education process begins by bringing out the learner's beliefs and theories, examining and testing them, and then integrating the new, more refined ideas in the person's belief systems, the learning process will be facilitated" (p. 28). The authors believe that involving students in substantive debates challenges them to learn and grow in the fashion described by Dewey and Kolb. Participation in a debate stimulates clarification and critical evaluation of the evidence, logic, and values underlying one's own policy position. In addition, to debate effectively students must understand and accurately evaluate the opposing perspective. The ensuing tension between two distinct but legitimate views is designed to yield a reevaluation and reconstruction of knowledge and beliefs pertaining to the issue.

# 1nc

## Case

Preventative detention is the only means of controlling Al-Qaedastyle terrorists – empirical examples of released detainees rejoining Al-Qaeda. The government is rendered impotent without this option.

Schied, 10 (Apr 7, Don E., *Indefinite Detention of Mega-terrorists in the War on Terror*, Criminal Justice Ethics, 29:1, 1-28, DOI: 10.1080/0711291003654146)

In saying a person is too dangerous to release, the implication is that, if released, he will not be deterred from further crime by the threat of future punishment. This may be because he is mentally out of touch with reality, or it may be that the person has overwhelming urges he cannot control.26 In the case of megaterrorists, the individual is undeterrable, presumably, because he is committed to carrying out terrorist activities as a matter of firm, ideological conviction and/or religious beliefs. The possibility of being captured and punished or losing his life does not deter him. In fact, the prospect of becoming a martyr for his cause may actually be a positive incentive, as it apparently is for some suicide bombers. Since the person is undeterrable, his conduct cannot be controlled or significantly influenced by the threat of future punishment. The state’s only realistic option, therefore, is preventive detention.

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The case of Zacarias Moussaoui might serve to illustrate the point. Taking flying lessons is not a crime,

even if he was uninterested in learning how to take off or land an airplane. Nevertheless, he was certainly dangerous and undeterrable. Here was an avowed terrorist who repeatedly expressed approval of al-Qaeda’s ‘‘jihad’’ against the United States and announced his own desire to kill as many Americans as possible. He stated, for example, ‘‘I will be delighted to come back one day to blow myself into your new W.T.C. if ever you rebuild it.’’28 Imagine\*contrary to fact\*that Zacarias Moussaoui had been acquitted of all charges at his federal trial. The Moussaoui trial, in fact, was something of a circus. He was mentally unstable, filed crazy pleadings and, for some time, insisted on acting as hisown counsel. Hemade speeches in court that compromised his defense, including belligerent behavior toward the judge, as well as toward both prosecution and defense lawyers; and, ultimately, he pled guilty. Had Moussaoui been a sane and shrewd defendant, the Government might well have failed to carry its burden of proof. In such circumstances, should the Government simply release him? To do so would be extremely foolish, as he would still present a continuing and extreme danger to the United States. Apart from this hypothetical, there are reports of any number of actual terrorism prisoners who have been released only to rejoin jihad and their fight against the West. For example, one Guantanamo detainee, Abdullah Ghulam Rasoul, was transferred to Afghanistan in 2007 and then released by the Kabul government. According to reports, he is now the commander of operations for the Taliban in southern Afghanistan. Another detainee, Said Ali al-Shihri, was returned to his native Saudi Arabia in 2007 and is now reportedly a leader of al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Yemen.29

#### **Al-Qaedastyle terrorism is uniquely dangerous – 4 reasons why it can go nuclear**

Schied, 10 (Apr 7, Don E., *Indefinite Detention of Mega-terrorists in the War on Terror*, Criminal Justice Ethics, 29:1, 1-28, DOI: 10.1080/0711291003654146)

The kind of terrorism to be addressed in this essay is the sort of terrorism exemplified by al-Qaeda’s¶ 9/11 attacks. At least four features distinguish this terrorism from other forms of terrorist activity.16 First, it has a global reach. Like a pandemic, this form of terrorism is not confined to a single state or locale. International terrorists recruit followers from all over the world and strike anywhere in the world. We are told, for instance, that al-Qaeda may have terrorist cells in some 50 to 60 countries. By contrast, most terrorism groups have been, and still are, national or regional in their operations. Although their funding may come from various parts of the world, most terrorist groups operate within a single country\*for example, the ETA in the Basque part of Spain; Hamas in Gaza; Hizbullah mainly in Lebanon; and, until recently, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. Second, unlike the fairly welldefined structures of some terrorist groups, the organization of al-Qaedastyle terrorism is extremely amorphous. There is no one with whom to negotiate\*no one, apparently, who could effectively declare a ceasefire, no one with authority to conclude an armistice or peace treaty. This terrorism seems to be a kind of political/religious movement with a life of its own rather than an organized social entity.17 Third, this terrorism is stateless. The enemy is not associated with any nation-state, nor, indeed, with any specific geographical location. A terrorist group may have hideouts and training camps in a given country, but the group itself is not committed to that territory. Two significant consequences follow. First, international terrorism cannot be deterred by the threat of retaliatory strikes\*as was the case with the nuclear-deterrence doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD) during the Cold War. Second, an international-terrorism organization is not responsible to any state, and, crucially, no single state has any control over it. Consequently, there is no recognized state to enforce a ceasefire agreement upon its terrorist-citizens, even if such an agreement could be achieved. A fourth, and the most important, feature that distinguishes al-Qaedastyle terrorism is its great lethality of mass murder. The development of science and technology has made it possible for terrorists to acquire highly lethal weapons and even biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Indeed, confirmed reports have established that Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda have sought nuclear weapons.18¶ Globalization and technological developments have enabled small terrorist cells, independent of any¶ state, to wield deadly force on a scale that was once only within the capability of states. The possibility of¶ acquiring weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, by those who cannot be deterred by the threat of retaliatory strikes, makes al-Qaeda-type terrorism tremendously dangerous. The emerging picture is that of possible worldwide anarchy in which any group of any size anywhere in the world might undertake devastating attacks. Indeed, it seems only a matter of time before a so-called ‘‘suitcase’’ nuclear bomb obliterates a major city somewhere in the world.19 Thus, the kind of terrorism we are facing is that of sustained campaigns of highly lethal terrorist groups, like al-Qaeda, who operate globally\*the kind of terrorism Richard Falk has dubbed, quite aptly, ‘‘mega-terrorism

#### Motives for terrorist recruitment are varied, but similar to gang recruitment. Can’t draw ties to one specific policy.

Stern, 10 (Jessica, Jan 10, Harvard Law School, author of Terror in the Name of God, *5 myths about who becomes a terrorist*, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/08/AR2010010803585.html>)

Terrorist movements often arise in reaction to a perceived injustice, whether real or imagined. Yet ideology is not the only, or even the most important, factor in an individual's decision to join. In my research and interviews with terrorists, I have found that operatives are often more interested in adopting a new identity than in supporting a terrorist group's stated goals. Many speak, in particular, about being motivated by a feeling of humiliation. A Kashmiri militant founded his group because, he said, "Muslims have been overpowered by the West. Our ego hurts . . . we are not able to live up to our own standards for ourselves." ¶ The reasons that some people become terrorists are as varied as the reasons that others choose conventional professions: market conditions, social networks, contact with recruiters, education and individual preferences. And just as the passion for justice that may animate a young law student is not necessarily what keeps him working long hours at a law firm while hoping to make partner, a terrorist's motivations for staying with his cause can also change. ¶ Most terrorist groups disappear quickly; those that survive tend to have the sort of flexible ideology that can attract a diverse array of recruits and funders. Al-Qaeda is among the most disciplined terrorist groups, but its goals and its list of enemies are constantly shifting. Documents analyzed by scholars at the Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy reveal an astonishing lack of clarity about the group's purpose, even among leaders of the organization. Abu'l-Walid, a leading strategic thinker for al-Qaeda, has complained about constantly shifting strategic goals, lamenting that "waging jihad like a rhinoceros is stupid and futile." ¶ **5. The typical terrorist recruit is an alienated loner.**¶ According to The Washington Post, Abdulmutallab, the alleged Christmas airplane attacker, [wrote in](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/28/AR2009122802492.html) an online Islamic forum: "I have no one . . . to consult, no one to support me and I feel depressed and lonely. I do not know what to do. And then I think this loneliness leads me to other problems." ¶ But for most terrorist recruits, the problem isn't so much a lack of friends as the wrong friends. This dynamic isn't so different from the way gang recruiting works in the United States: Terrorists often join an armed struggle because they have a buddy who has done so. In a survey of 516 Guantanamo detainees, researchers at the Combating Terrorism Center found that knowing another member of al-Qaeda was a better predictor of who became a terrorist than was belief in the idea of jihad. ¶ It is interesting to note that in its rehabilitation efforts, the Saudi government tries to compete with convicts' ties to terrorism networks by reconnecting them to their families and home communities, and most controversially, by trying to find wives for the former fighters. ¶ Ultimately, some individuals may join terrorist groups out of a misplaced desire to transform society. But over time, the social and psychological rewards of belonging can eclipse such motivations. Terrorists want to better their own circumstances at least as much as they want to change the world. ¶ *Jessica Stern serves on the Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law and is a lecturer at Harvard Law School. She is the author of "Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill."*

#### Detention doesn’t drive al Qaeda—comparatively less important in recruiting

Joscelyn 2010(Thomas, The Weekly Standard, December 27, "Gitmo Is Not Al Qaeda's 'Number One Recruitment Tool'", http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/gitmo-not-al-qaedas-number-one-recruitment-tool\_524997.html?page=2)

THE WEEKLY STANDARD has reviewed translations of 34 messages and interviews delivered by top al Qaeda leaders operating in Pakistan and Afghanistan (“Al Qaeda Central”), including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, since January 2009. The translations were [published online](http://nefafoundation.org/index.cfm?pageID=44) by the NEFA Foundation. Guantanamo is mentioned in only 3 of the 34 messages. The other 31 messages contain no reference to Guantanamo. And even in the three messages in which al Qaeda mentions the detention facility it is not a prominent theme.¶ Instead, al Qaeda’s leaders repeatedly focus on a narrative that has dominated their propaganda for the better part of two decades. According to bin Laden, Zawahiri, and other al Qaeda chieftains, there is a Zionist-Crusader conspiracy against Muslims. Relying on this deeply paranoid and conspiratorial worldview, al Qaeda routinely calls upon Muslims to take up arms against Jews and Christians, as well as any Muslims rulers who refuse to fight this imaginary coalition. ¶ This theme forms the backbone of al Qaeda’s messaging – not Guantanamo. ¶ To illustrate this point, consider the results of some basic keyword searches. Guantanamo is mentioned a mere 7 times in the 34 messages we reviewed. (Again, all 7 of those references appear in just 3 of the 34 messages.) ¶ By way of comparison, all of the following keywords are mentioned far more frequently: Israel/Israeli/Israelis (98 mentions), Jew/Jews (129), Zionist(s) (94), Palestine/Palestinian (200), Gaza (131), and Crusader(s) (322). (Note: Zionist is often paired with Crusader in al Qaeda’s rhetoric.)¶ Naturally, al Qaeda’s leaders also focus on the wars in Afghanistan (333 mentions) and Iraq (157). Pakistan (331), which is home to the jihadist hydra, is featured prominently, too. Al Qaeda has designs on each of these three nations and implores willing recruits to fight America and her allies there. Keywords related to other jihadist hotspots also feature more prominently than Gitmo, including Somalia (67 mentions), Yemen (18) and Chechnya (15). ¶ Simply put, there is no evidence in the 34 messages we reviewed that al Qaeda’s leaders are using Guantanamo as a recruiting tool. Undoubtedly, “Al Qaeda Central” has released other messages during the past two years that are not included in our sample. Some of those messages may refer to Guantanamo. And some of the al Qaeda messages provided by NEFA, which does a remarkable job collecting and translating al Qaeda’s statements and interviews, may be only partial translations of longer texts. ¶ However, the messages we reviewed also surely include most of what al Qaeda’s honchos have said publicly since January 2009. These messages do not support the president’s claim. A closer look at the 3 out of 34 messages in which “Al Qaeda Central” actually referred to Guantanamo reveals just how weak the president’s argument is. Even in these messages al Qaeda is far more interested in other themes.¶ In a February 17, 2010 message entitled, “[The Way to Save the Earth](http://nefafoundation.org/file/nefa_ublwaytosaveearth0210.pdf),” Osama bin Laden made an offhand reference to Guantanamo. But it is hardly a prominent feature of the terror master’s message. As bin Laden makes clear in the opening lines, his main concern is climate change.¶ “This is a message to the whole world about those who cause climate change and its dangers – intentionally or unintentionally – and what we must do,” bin Laden said. Bin Laden blames the “greedy heads of major corporations” and “senior capitalists” who are “characterized by wickedness and hardheartedness” for the supposed deleterious effects of global warming.¶ Bin Laden does refer to Guantanamo, but it is brief and in the context of a rambling passage. In the surrounding sentences, bin Laden criticizes America for waging war in Iraq for oil, incorrectly claims that America and her allies have “killed, wounded, orphaned, widowed and displaced more than 10 million Iraqis,” and calls President Obama’s acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize “an extreme example of the deception and humiliation of humanity.” ¶ If bin Laden’s February 17th message is evidence that al Qaeda is using Guantanamo as a recruiting tool, then it is also evidence that al Qaeda is using climate change and President Obama’s Nobel to earn new recruits.¶ The other two messages in our sample that refer to Guantanamo do not fare much better when any amount of scrutiny is applied.

#### **Psychological justification for indefinite detention – some terrorists develop enduring reasons to pursue violence**

Stern, 11 (Jessica, Harvard Law Lecturer, author of Terror in the name of God, *What Motivates Terrorists?*, http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/58841)

Psychologists who study terrorism have been claiming for decades that there is no terrorist personality and that terrorists are psychologically "normal." Even if that were true, it seems highly unlikely that a person would remain "normal" after having spent several years killing innocents.¶ Anyone who has ever sat down with a professional terrorist knows, in her bones, that while group dynamics may be the most important factor, individual psychology is not irrelevant, even if we cannot yet measure how. For example, one does not need to spend many days in the Gaza Strip before one begins to get a sense of the impact of constant fear and humiliation—issues that terrorists emphasize in interviews about why they got involved in terrorism. If terrorism can be a source of validation, then surely helping adherents come to terms with the humiliation they have experienced could be part of the "cure." To that end, the Saudi rehabilitation program includes classes in self-esteem.¶ Some individuals join terrorist groups or movements as true believers in an idea, but evolve, over time, into professional killers. Once that happens, the emotional and material beneﬁts of belonging can become more important than the spiritual beneﬁts of belief. This suggests that some terrorists might develop enduring reasons—perhaps even a compulsion—to pursue violence.¶ Such individuals should be detained preventively and the keys thrown away, as some governments do with sexual predators. But in cases in which the law precludes indeﬁnite detention, governments may be forced to release suspects. In those instances, ofﬁcials will have to choose whether to ignore the threat posed by these people or work with other governments to develop tools to reduce the risk of violence. Governments must consider difﬁcult tradeoffs. On the one hand, how great is the chance that graduates of deradicalization programs will return to terrorism or other forms of violent crime?

# Block

## 2NC – A2 – Roll Playing Bad - Topline

### We are not roll playing – we are policy simulation and imagination – there is a distinction between stating the government should do something because it is a better option and imagining a world where the government does do that policy and believing you are Obama – our model of debate has tremendous educational value that avoids their offense

Hanghoj 8 http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008 Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant professor.

4.2.1. Play and imagination Among educational theorists, John Dewey is well-known for stressing the learning potential of play and game activities within education (Makedon, 1993; Vaage, 2000). Thus, Dewey devotes an entire chapter in Democracy and Education to “Play and Work in the Curriculum”. In tune with the main argument presented throughout the book, he begins the chapter by noting that it is “desirable” that education, as such, starts “from and with the experience and capacities of learners” (Dewey, 1916: 202). This can be done through the “the introduction of forms of activity, in play and work, similar to those in which children and youth engage outside of school” (Dewey, 1916: 202). Dewey makes no fundamental distinction between play and work activities, as they “both involve ends consciously entertained and the selection and adaptation of materials and processes designed to affect the desired ends” (Dewey, 1916: 210). Thus, play and work mostly differ in terms of “timespans”, which “influence the directness of means and ends” (Dewey, 1916: 210). In this sense, play and work activities simply represent two different aspects on a continuum of meaningful relations between ends and means. This assertion also goes against the commonsensical notion that play is goal-free or is an end in itself. In summary, Dewey views play as being meaningful, goal-oriented, and interestbased. Moreover, play is free and plastic as it is both directed toward present and future (projected) activities (cf. chapter 2). However, in order to realise the educational value of play it is necessary to understand play as an imaginative activity (Dewey, 1916: 245). Play activities are too important to be reduced to a purely developmental phenomenon among children: It is still usual to regard this [imaginative] activity as a specially marked-off stage of childish growth, and to overlook the fact that the difference between play and what is regarded as serious employment should be not a difference between the presence and absence of imagination, but a difference in the materials with which imagination is occupied (Dewey, 1916: 245). In this way, play is closely linked with the imagination, which is “the medium of realization of every kind of thing which lies beyond the scope of direct physical response” (Dewey, 1916: 245). Put differently, Dewey’s conception of imagination represents “the capacity to concretely perceive what is before us in light of what could be” (Fesmire, 2003: 65). Thus, the educational value of play activities must be based on the understanding that: The imagination is as much a normal and integral part of human activity as is muscular movement. The educative value of manual activities and of laboratory exercises, as well as of play, depends upon the extent in which they aid in bringing about a sensing of the meaning of what is going on. In effect, if not in name, they are dramatizations. Their utilitarian value in forming habits of skill to be used for tangible results is important, but not when isolated from the appreciative side. Were it not for the accompanying play of imagination, there would be no road from a direct activity to representative knowledge; for it is by imagination that symbols are translated over into a direct meaning and integrated with a narrower activity so as to expand and enrich it (Dewey, 1916: 245-6; my emphasis added). Play activity as such is no guarantee for avoiding “mechanical methods in teaching” (Dewey, 1916: 245). Thus, the value of educational gaming is entirely dependent upon whether the imaginative aspects of play are able to support students understanding of “what is going on”. In this way, imaginative play allows meaning to be created through “dramatizations” of particular aspects of knowledge. Consequently, the presumably distinct categories of imagination and reality represent a subtle continuum of finely graded experience as human beings do not experience reality directly but always through symbols, language, and social interaction (Waskul & Lust, 2004).

#### Resolved proves the resolution requires Switch Side Debate and policy action

Parcher 1—Jeff Parcher, Former Debate Coach at Georgetown University [Feburary 2001, http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html]

(1) Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Frimness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statemnt of a deciion, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconcievable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desireablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the prelimanary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.

### 2NC – A2 – We Meet

#### AND – The fact that we couldn’t tell what you advocate makes your advocacy vague and shifting – this turns case

Steve 7 (citizen activist against injustice, Anonymous member of Black Block and Active Transformation, civil justice movements, , Date Last Mod. Feb 8, <http://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp/free/global/a16dcdiscussion.htm>) KENTUCKY

What follows is not an attempt to discredit our efforts. It was a powerful and inspiring couple of days. I feel it is important to always analyze our actions and be self-critical, and try to move forward, advancing our movement. The State has used Seattle as an excuse to beef up police forces all over the country. In many ways Seattle caught us off-guard, and we will pay the price for it if we don't become better organized. The main weakness of the Black Block in DC was that clear goals were not elaborated in a strategic way and tactical leadership was not developed to coordinate our actions. By leadership I don't mean any sort of authority, but some coordination beside the call of the mob. We were being led around DC by any and everybody. All someone would do is make a call loud enough, and the Black Block would be in motion. We were often lead around by Direct Action Network (DAN - organizers of the civil disobedience) tactical people, for lack of our own. We were therefore used to assist in their strategy, which was doomed from the get go, because we had none of our own. The DAN strategy was the same as it was in Seattle, which the DC police learned how to police. Our only chance at disrupting the IMF/WB meetings was with drawing the police out of their security perimeter, therefore weakening it and allowing civil disobedience people to break through the barriers. This needs to be kept in mind as we approach the party conventions this summer. Philadelphia is especially ripe for this new strategy, since the convention is not happening in the business center. Demonstrations should be planned all over the city to draw police all over the place. On Monday the event culminated in the ultimate anti-climax, an arranged civil disobedience. The civil disobedience folks arranged with police to allow a few people to protest for a couple minutes closer to where the meetings were happening, where they would then be arrested. The CD strategy needed arrests. Our movement should try to avoid this kind of stuff as often as possible. While this is pretty critical of the DAN/CD strategy, it is so in hindsight. This is the same strategy that succeeded in shutting down the WTO ministerial in Seattle. And, while we didn't shut down the IMF/WB meetings, we did shut down 90 blocks of the American government on tax day - so we should be empowered by their fear of us! The root of the lack of strategy problem is a general problem within the North American anarchist movement. We get caught up in tactical thinking without establishing clear goals. We need to elaborate how our actions today fit into a plan that leads to the destruction of the state and capitalism, white supremacy and patriarchy. Moving away from strictly tactical thinking toward political goals and long term strategy needs to be a priority for the anarchist movement. No longer can we justify a moralistic approach to the latest outrage - running around like chickens with their heads cut off. We need to prioritize developing the political unity of our affinity groups and collectives, as well as developing regional federations and starting the process of developing the political principles that they will be based around (which will be easier if we have made some headway in our local groups). The NorthEastern Federation of Anarchist Communists (NEFAC) is a good example of doing this. They have prioritized developing the political principles they are federated around. The strategies that we develop in our collectives and networks will never be blueprints set in stone. They will be documents in motion, constantly being challenged and adapted. But without a specific elaboration of what we are working toward and how we plan to get there, we will always end up making bad decisions. If we just assume everyone is on the same page, we will find out otherwise really quick when shit gets critical.

### 2NC – Fairness Internal Link

#### Yes debate may never be perfect — BUT ours is superior – 81% of debaters vote neg

Preston 3—Thomas Preston, Professor of communications at the University of Missouri-St. Louis [Summer 2003, “No-topic debating in Parliamentary Debate: Students and Critic Reactions,” http://cas.bethel.edu/dept/comm/npda/journal/vol9no5.pdf]

The study involved forty-three students and nine critics who participated in a parliamentary debate tournament where no topic was assigned for the fourth round debates. True to the idea of openness, no rules regarding the topic were announced; no topic, or written instructions other than time limits and judging instruction, were provided. In this spirit, the participants first provided anecdotal reactions to the no-topic debate, so that the data from this study could emerge from discussion. Second, respondents provided demographic data so that patterns could be compared along three dimensions. These dimensions, the independent variables for the student portion of the study, involved three items: 1) level of debate experience; 2) whether NPDA was the only format of parliamentary debate the students had experienced; and 3) whether students had participated in NDT or CEDA policy debate. Third, the questions were to determine how students rated the debates based on criteria for good debate-educational value, clash, and a fair division of ground. Students were also asked two general questions: whether they would try the no-topic debate again, and whether they liked the no-topic round. These questions constituted the dependent variables for the student study. Because the sample was small, descriptive statistical data were gathered from critics. Taking into account the experience of the critics, additional questions concerning items such as whether no-topic debating deepened discussion. Both students and critics were asked which side they thought the no-topic approach favored, and the students with NDT/ CEDA policy debating experience were asked if a no-topic debating season would be good for policy debate.For the objective items, critics and students were asked to circle a number between 1 and 7 to indicate the strength of reaction to each item (Appendix I and Appendix II). In scoring responses, the most favorable rating received the highest score of seven and the least favorable rating a score of one. In some instances, values that were circled on the sheet were reversed such that the most favorable reaction to that category received the higher score. Frequency distributions and statistics were then tabulated for each question, and the anecdotal remarks were tabulated. For the student empirical data, t-tests were conducted to determine whether overall debate experience, NPDA experience, or policy experience affected how the students reacted to an item. As a test for significance, p was set to less than or equal to .05. Finally, of the 43 responses, 35, or 81.4 per cent, felt that the no-topic debate skewed the outcome of the debate toward one side or the other. Of those responses, 32 (91.4 per cent of those indicating a bias, or 74.4 per cent of all respondents) indicated that the no-topic debate gave an advantage to the Government. Three (8.6 per cent of those indicating a bias, or 7.0 per cent of all respondents) indicated that the no-topic debate gave an advantage to the Opposition.

### 2NC – Fairness Outweighs

#### Fairness is a decision rule—it rigs the game and makes neutral evaluation by a judge impossible

Loland 2 [Sigmund, Professor of Sport Philosophy and Ethics at the Norwegian University of Sport and Physical Education, *Fair Play and Sport*, 95]

Rule violations are of several kinds. The long jumper who steps over the board has her jump measured longer than it really is. By illegally hitting a competitor on the arm, a basketball player ‘steals’ the ball and scores two points. I have argued that without adhering to a shared, just ethos, evaluations of performance among competitors become invalid. Advantages resulting from rule violations that are no part of such an ethos must be considered non-relevant inequalities that ought to be eliminated or compensated for. The argument is similar to that in the discussion of equality. This time, however, we are dealing not with external conditions, equipment, or support systems, but with competitors’ actions themselves.

#### Only a fair topic allows for debate to continue

Speice and Lyle 3 — Patrick Speice, Debater at Wake Forest University, and Jim Lyle, Director of Debate at Clarion University, 2003 (“Traditional Policy Debate: Now More Than Ever,” *Debater’s Research Guide*, Available Online at http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/ MiscSites/DRGArticles/SpeiceLyle2003htm.htm, Accessed 09-11-2005)

As with any game or sport, creating a level playing field that affords each competitor a fair chance of victory is integral to the continued existence of debate as an activity. If the game is slanted toward one particular competitor, the other participants are likely to pack up their tubs and go home, as they don’t have a realistic shot of winning such a “rigged game.” Debate simply wouldn’t be fun if the outcome was pre-determined and certain teams knew that they would always win or lose. The incentive to work hard to develop new and innovative arguments would be non-existent because wins and losses would not relate to how much research a particular team did. TPD, as defined above, offers the best hope for a level playing field that makes the game of debate fun and educational for all participants.

## 2NC – Dialogue Internal Link

### That makes debate and dialogue impossible

Hanghoj 8 http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008 Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant professor.

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

## 2NC – Dialogue Outweighs

### AND - Dialogue is critical to affirming any value—shutting down deliberation devolves into totalitarianism and re-inscribes oppression

Morson 4 http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/0521831059.pdf#page=331 Northwestern Professor, Prof. Morson's work ranges over a variety of areas: literary theory (especially narrative); the history of ideas, both Russian and European; a variety of literary genres (especially satire, utopia, and the novel); and his favorite writers -- Chekhov, Gogol, and, above all, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. He is especially interested in the relation of literature to philosophy.

Bakhtin viewed the whole process of “ideological” (in the sense of ideas and values, however unsystematic) development as an endless dialogue. As teachers, we find it difficult to avoid a voice of authority, however much we may think of ours as the rebel’s voice, because our rebelliousness against society at large speaks in the authoritative voice of our subculture.We speak the language and thoughts of academic educators, even when we imagine we are speaking in no jargon at all, and that jargon, inaudible to us, sounds with all the overtones of authority to our students. We are so prone to think of ourselves as fighting oppression that it takes some work to realize that we ourselves may be felt as oppressive and overbearing, and that our own voice may provoke the same reactions that we feel when we hear an authoritative voice with which we disagree. So it is often helpful to think back on the great authoritative oppressors and reconstruct their self-image: helpful, but often painful. I remember, many years ago, when, as a recent student rebel and activist, I taught a course on “The Theme of the Rebel” and discovered, to my considerable chagrin, that many of the great rebels of history were the very same people as the great oppressors. There is a famous exchange between Erasmus and Luther, who hoped to bring the great Dutch humanist over to the Reformation, but Erasmus kept asking Luther how he could be so certain of so many doctrinal points. We must accept a few things to be Christians at all, Erasmus wrote, but surely beyond that there must be room for us highly fallible beings to disagree. Luther would have none of such tentativeness. He knew, he was sure. The Protestant rebels were, for a while, far more intolerant than their orthodox opponents. Often enough, the oppressors are the ones who present themselves and really think of themselves as liberators. Certainty that one knows the root cause of evil: isn’t that itself often the root cause? We know from Tsar Ivan the Terrible’s letters denouncing Prince Kurbsky, a general who escaped to Poland, that Ivan saw himself as someone who had been oppressed by noblemen as a child and pictured himself as the great rebel against traditional authority when he killed masses of people or destroyed whole towns. There is something in the nature of maximal rebellion against authority that produces ever greater intolerance, unless one is very careful. For the skills of fighting or refuting an oppressive power are not those of openness, self-skepticism, or real dialogue. In preparing for my course, I remember my dismay at reading Hitler’s Mein Kampf and discovering that his self-consciousness was precisely that of the rebel speaking in the name of oppressed Germans, and that much of his amazing appeal – otherwise so inexplicable – was to the German sense that they were rebelling victims. In our time, the Serbian Communist and nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic exploited much the same appeal. Bakhtin surely knew that Communist totalitarianism, the Gulag, and the unprecedented censorship were constructed by rebels who had come to power. His favorite writer, Dostoevsky, used to emphasize that the worst oppression comes from those who, with the rebellious psychology of “the insulted and humiliated,” have seized power – unless they have somehow cultivated the value of dialogue, as Lenin surely had not, but which Eva, in the essay by Knoeller about teaching The Autobiography of Malcolm X, surely had. Rebels often make the worst tyrants because their word, the voice they hear in their consciousness, has borrowed something crucial from the authoritative word it opposed, and perhaps exaggerated it: the aura of righteous authority. If one’s ideological becoming is understood as a struggle in which one has at last achieved the truth, one is likely to want to impose that truth with maximal authority; and rebels of the next generation may proceed in much the same way, in an ongoing spiral of intolerance.

### AND - Lack of dialogue results in backlash that undermines the aff

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Whether or not you should include arguments for and against your case depends very much on your audience. If you know that they already agree with you, a one-sided argument is quite acceptable. If they are opposed to your point of view, then a one-sided message will actually be less effective, being dismissed as biased. Even if your audience don't know much about the subject, but do know that there are counterarguments (even if they don't know what they are) will lead them to reject your views as biased. Hovland's investigations into mass propaganda used to change soldiers' attitudes also suggests that the intelligence of the receivers is an important factor, a two-sided argument tending to be more persuasive with the more intelligent audience.

## 2NC – Government Engagement Internal Link

### Policy gaming is crucial to creative education that guides policy

Eijkman 12

The role of simulations in the authentic learning for national security policy development: Implications for Practice / Dr. Henk Simon Eijkman. [electronic resource] <http://nsc.anu.edu.au/test/documents/Sims_in_authentic_learning_report.pdf>. Dr Henk Eijkman is currently an independent consultant as well as visiting fellow at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy and is Visiting Professor of Academic Development, Annasaheb Dange College of Engineering and Technology in India. As a sociologist he developed an active interest in tertiary learning and teaching with a focus on socially inclusive innovation and culture change. He has taught at various institutions in the social sciences and his work as an adult learning specialist has taken him to South Africa, Malaysia, Palestine, and India. He publishes widely in international journals, serves on Conference Committees and editorial boards of edited books and international journal

Policy simulations stimulate Creativity Participation in policy games has proved to be a highly effective way of developing new combinations of experience and creativity, which is precisely what innovation requires (Geurts et al. 2007: 548). Gaming, whether in analog or digital mode, has the power to stimulate creativity, and is one of the most engaging and liberating ways for making group work productive, challenging and enjoyable. Geurts et al. (2007) cite one instance where, in a National Health Care policy change environment, ‘the many parties involved accepted the invitation to participate in what was a revolutionary and politically very sensitive experiment precisely because it was a game’ (Geurts et al. 2007: 547). Data from other policy simulations also indicate the uncovering of issues of which participants were not aware, the emergence of new ideas not anticipated, and a perception that policy simulations are also an enjoyable way to formulate strategy (Geurts et al. 2007). Gaming puts the players in an ‘experiential learning’ situation, where they discover a concrete, realistic and complex initial situation, and the gaming process of going through multiple learning cycles helps them work through the situation as it unfolds. Policy gaming stimulates ‘learning how to learn’, as in a game, and learning by doing alternates with reflection and discussion. The progression through learning cycles can also be much faster than in real-life (Geurts et al. 2007: 548). The bottom line is that problem solving in policy development processes requires creative experimentation. This cannot be primarily taught via ‘camp-fire’ story telling learning mode but demands hands-on ‘veld learning’ that allow for safe creative and productive experimentation. This is exactly what good policy simulations provide (De Geus, 1997; Ringland, 2006). In simulations participants cannot view issues solely from either their own perspective or that of one dominant stakeholder (Geurts et al. 2007). Policy simulations enable the seeking of Consensus Games are popular because historically people seek and enjoy the tension of competition, positive rivalry and the procedural justice of impartiality in safe and regulated environments. As in games, simulations temporarily remove the participants from their daily routines, political pressures, and the restrictions of real-life protocols. In consensus building, participants engage in extensive debate and need to act on a shared set of meanings and beliefs to guide the policy process in the desired direction

## 2NC – Decision Making Internal Link

### Policy simulation’s good is best – key to decision making and all portable skills

Robert Farley 12, assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky, February 29, 2012, “Teaching Crisis Decision-Making Through Simulations,” World Politics Review, online: http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11628/over-the-horizon-teaching-crisis-decision-making-through-simulations

What goes for war goes for policy other than war. Public and foreign policy programs have increasingly used simulations as training and teaching tools. Policy initiatives, whether foreign or domestic, generate strategic dynamics; players respond to how other players have changed the game environment. Consequently, playing games can help students develop expertise regarding how to manage strategic dynamics, as well as more specific skills such as crisis negotiation. At the same time, foreign and public policy schools have become attractive to serious simulators because of the presence of a large number of relatively knowledgeable graduate and advanced undergraduate students with time on their hands. The Army War College -- which runs two negotiation simulations, one involving Nagorno-Karabakh and the other Cyprus -- has taken advantage of this by running its simulations at several major universities, adapting the structure of the game for different groups of players. Last summer, the strategic forecasting firm Wikistrat -- for which I am an analyst -- ran a grand strategy competition involving a large number of major foreign policy programs. Accordingly, the universe of potential policy simulations and “war games” is virtually limitless. The Paxsims blog, co-edited by WPR contributor Rex Brynen, focuses on the serious use of international political and military simulations, listing dozens of different games played to inform public policy decisions. These simulations include modeling relief efforts following the Haiti earthquake, refining peacekeeping and civilian protection in hostile environments, “replaying” the 2007 Surge in Baghdad, rethinking the partition of India and Pakistan, and -- of course -- sketching out an Israeli bombing campaign against Iranian nuclear facilities. As in many other fields, the Internet has transformed the development process of policy-oriented simulations. Widely available information and modern information technology makes it possible to bring together subject matter experts with designers, and crowdsourcing helps demonstrate and correct problems and flaws with the simulation. Indeed, the Wikistrat model is built directly on the idea that smart crowdsourcing can produce better policy analysis than reliance on relatively isolated expert opinion. Patterson School simulations focus on the teaching and training aspects of gaming rather than on verisimilitude. Previous Patterson School simulations have involved a revolution in Belarus, a pirate attack off Somalia, the aftermath of the death of Fidel Castro, an Israeli strike on Iran and a nuclear accident in North Korea. The purpose of these games is to force decision-making under difficult circumstances, hopefully modeling the conditions under which policy professionals produce recommendations and make decisions. This is not to say that nothing can be learned from the course of the game. In the 2012 simulation, members of the Sinaloa drug cartel launched simultaneous large-scale attacks on the Bellagio in Las Vegas as well as on several targets in Acapulco. All the attacks involved car bombings followed up by teams of heavily armed gunmen employing automatic weapons and hand grenades. The Patterson student cohort was divided into teams representing the Mexican and American national security bureaucracies, regional governments and cartels, with the exercise simulating the government response in the 24 hours immediately following the attack. The simulation ended in an abortive meeting between U.S. President Barack Obama and Mexican President Felipe Calderon. Domestic political pressures played a role on both sides, with Texas Gov. Rick Perry launching a blistering series of attacks against Obama’s handling of the crisis, and the Mexican police consistently undercutting the efforts of the Mexican army. Our simulation highlighted the problems of bureaucratic competition, indistinct boundaries of responsibility, and mistrust between agencies and governments. The game also gave students an appreciation of the difficulties of dealing with an active and independent media, which remained largely outside their control. Most importantly, it gave students a taste of the difficulty in arriving at coherent, cohesive action even when policy objectives remained broadly in agreement. While students may never face this precise crisis in their subsequent professional careers, they undoubtedly will face situations where policymakers demand options, sleep be damned. Increasingly realistic simulations involving larger and larger numbers of interested, well-informed players will help structure public policy decision-making for the foreseeable future. Someday, strong performance in such simulations, as well as the ability to craft useful games, may even prove a pathway to success in a public policy career.

## 2NC – SSD Internal Link

### AND – the link threshold for our argument is small – but the impacts are large

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Totalitarianism and the Competitive Space of Agonism Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism andEichmann in Jerusa¬lem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into solipsistic and unreflective behavior. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58) What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social." Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who abdicate their human capacities and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with disastrous consequences, both for other people and eventually for themselves" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, butnot act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibil¬ity for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a totalitarian system, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody. It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitar¬ian systems, Arendt's solution is the playful and competitive space of agonism; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the assumption of competition, and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments, of one's thought. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives. Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it. The situation is agonistic not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict, but because conflict is a necessary consequence of difference. This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity. Continued… Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banal¬ity of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to engage in mass murder because he was able not to think about it, especially not from the perspective of the victims, and he was able to exempt himself from personal responsibility by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87). Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes, Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the central mystery of the holocaust—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87) Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social. Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4). Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive. To put it another way, theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies. Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38). By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others: Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am ponder¬ing a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241) There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; participants are interlocutors and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed. Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259). Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. InEichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in bothrhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238). The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). The paradoxical nature of agonism (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking. Arendt's Polemical Agonism As I said, agonism does have its advocates within rhetoric—Burke, Ong, Sloane, Gage, and Jarratt, for instance—but while each of these theorists proposes a form of conflictual argument, not one of these is as adversarial as Arendt's. Agonism can emphasize persuasion, as does John Gage's textbook The Shape of Reason or William Brandt et al.'s The Craft of Writing. That is, the goal of the argument is to identify the disagreement and then construct a text that gains the assent of the audience. This is not the same as what Gage (citing Thomas Conley) calls "asymmetrical theories of rhetoric": theories that "presuppose an active speaker and a passive audience, a speaker whose rhetorical task is therefore to do something to that audience" ("Reasoned" 6). Asymmetric rhetoric is not and cannot be agonistic. Persuasive agonism still values conflict, disagreement, and equality among interlocutors, but it has the goal of reaching agreement, as when Gage says that the process of argument should enable one's reasons to be "understood and believed" by others (Shape 5; emphasis added). Arendt's version is what one might call polemical agonism: it puts less emphasis on gaining assent, and it is exemplified both in Arendt's own writing and in Donald Lazere's "Ground Rules for Polemicists" and "Teaching the Political Conflicts." Both forms of agonism (persuasive and polemical) require substantive debate at two points in a long and recursive process. First, one engages in debate in order to invent one's argument; even silent thinking is a "dialogue of myself with myself (Lectures 40). The difference between the two approaches to agonism is clearest when one presents an argument to an audience assumed to be an opposition. In persuasive agonism, one plays down conflict and moves through reasons to try to persuade one's audience. In polemical agonism, however, one's intention is not necessarily to prove one's case, but to make public one' s thought in order to test it. In this way, communicability serves the same function in philosophy that replicability serves in the sciences; it is how one tests the validity of one's thought. In persuasive agonism, success is achieved through persuasion; in polemical agonism, success may be marked through the quality of subsequent controversy. Arendt quotes from a letter Kant wrote on this point: You know that I do not approach reasonable objections with the intention merely of refuting them, but that in thinking them over I always weave them into my judgments, and afford them the opportunity of overturning all my most cherished beliefs. I entertain the hope that by thus viewing my judgments impartially from the standpoint of others some third view that will improve upon my previous insight may be obtainable. {Lectures 42) Kant's use of "impartial" here is interesting: he is not describing a stance that is free of all perspective; it is impartial only in the sense that it is not his own view. This is the same way that Arendt uses the term; she does not advocate any kind of positivistic rationality, but instead a "universal interdependence" ("Truth" 242). She does not place the origin of the "disinterested pursuit of truth" in science, but at "the moment when Homer chose to sing the deeds of the Trojans no less than those of the Achaeans, and to praise the glory of Hector, the foe and the defeated man, no less than the glory of Achilles, the hero of his kinfolk" ("Truth" 262¬63). It is useful to note that Arendt tends not to use the term "universal," opting more often for "common," by which she means both what is shared and what is ordinary, a usage that evades many of the problems associated with universalism while preserving its virtues (for a brief butprovocative application of Arendt's notion of common, see Hauser 100-03). In polemical agonism, there is a sense in which one' s main goal is not to persuade one's readers; persuading one's readers, if this means that they fail to see errors and flaws in one' s argument, might actually be a sort of failure. It means that one wishes to put forward an argument that makes clear what one's stance is and why one holds it, but with the intention of provoking critique and counterargument. Arendt describes Kant's "hope" for his writings not that the number of people who agree with him would increase but "that the circle of his examiners would gradually be en¬larged" {Lectures 39); he wanted interlocutors, not acolytes. This is not consensus-based argument, nor is it what is sometimes called "consociational argument," nor is this argument as mediation or conflict resolution. Arendt (and her commentators) use the term "fight," and they mean it. When Arendt describes the values that are necessary in our world, she says, "They are a sense of honor, desire for fame and glory, the spirit of fighting without hatred and 'without the spirit of revenge,' and indifference to material advantages" {Crises 167). Pitkin summarizes Arendt's argument: "Free citizenship presupposes the ability to fight— openly, seriously, with commitment, and about things that really mat¬ter—without fanaticism, without seeking to exterminate one's oppo¬nents" (266). My point here is two-fold: first, there is not a simple binary opposition between persuasive discourse and eristic discourse, the conflictual versus the collaborative, or argument as opposed to debate. Second, while polemical agonismrequires diversity among interlocutors, and thus seems an extraordinarily appropriate notion, and while it may be a useful corrective to too much emphasis on persuasion, it seems to me that polemical agonism could easily slide into the kind of wrangling that is simply frustrating. Arendt does not describe just how one is to keep the conflict useful. Although she rejects the notion that politics is "no more than a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing countfs] but pleasure and profit, partisanship, and the lust for dominion," she does not say exactly how we are to know when we are engaging in the existential leap of argument versus when we are lusting for dominion ("Truth" 263). Like other proponents of agonism, Arendt argues that rhetoric does not lead individuals or communities to ultimate Truth; it leads to decisions that will necessarily have to be reconsidered. Even Arendt, who tends to express a greater faith than many agonists (such as Burke, Sloane, or Kastely) in the ability of individuals to perceive truth, insists that self-deception is always a danger, so public discourse is necessary as a form of testing (see especially Lectures and "Truth"). She remarks that it is difficult to think beyond one's self-interest and that "nothing, indeed, is more common, even among highly sophisticated people, than the blind obstinacy that becomes manifest in lack of imagination and failure to judge" ("Truth" 242). Agonism demands that one simultaneously trust and doubt one' s own perceptions, rely on one's own judgment and consider the judgments of others, think for oneself and imagine how others think. The question remains whether this is a kind of thought in which everyone can engage. Is the agonistic public sphere (whether political, academic, or scientific) only available to the few? Benhabib puts this criticism in the form of a question: "That is, is the 'recovery of the public space' under conditions of modernity necessarily an elitist and antidemocratic project that can hardly be reconciled with the demand for universal political emancipa¬tion and the universal extension of citizenship rights that have accompa¬nied modernity since the American and French Revolutions?" (75). This is an especially troubling question not only because Arendt's examples of agonistic rhetoric are from elitist cultures, but also because of com¬ments she makes, such as this one from The Human Condition: "As a living experience, thought has always been assumed, perhaps wrongly, to be known only to the few. It may not be presumptuous to believe that these few have not become fewer in our time" {Human 324). Yet, there are important positive political consequences of agonism. Arendt' s own promotion of the agonistic sphere helps to explain how the system could be actively moral. It is not an overstatement to say that a central theme in Arendt's work is the evil of conformity—the fact that the modern bureaucratic state makes possible extraordinary evil carried out by people who do not even have any ill will toward their victims. It does so by "imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (Human 40). It keeps people from thinking, and it keeps them behaving. The agonistic model's celebration of achievement and verbal skill undermines the political force of conformity, so it is a force against the bureaucratizing of evil. If people think for themselves, they will resist dogma; if people think of themselves as one of many, they will empathize; if people can do both, they will resist totalitarianism. And if they talk about what they see, tell their stories, argue about their perceptions, and listen to one another—that is, engage in rhetoric—then they are engaging in antitotalitarian action. In post-Ramistic rhetoric, it is a convention to have a thesis, and one might well wonder just what mine is—whether I am arguing for or against Arendt's agonism. Arendt does not lay out a pedagogy for us to follow (although one might argue that, if she had, it would lookmuch like the one Lazere describes in "Teaching"), so I am not claiming that greater attention to Arendt would untangle various pedagogical problems that teachers of writing face. Nor am I claiming that applying Arendt's views will resolve theoretical arguments that occupy scholarly journals. I am saying, on the one hand, that Arendt's connection of argument and thinking, as well as her perception that both serve to thwart totalitarian¬ism, suggest that agonal rhetoric (despite the current preference for collaborative rhetoric) is the best discourse for a diverse and inclusive public sphere. On the other hand, Arendt's advocacy of agonal rhetoric is troubling (and, given her own admiration for Kant, this may be intentional), especially in regard to its potential elitism, masculinism, failure to describe just how to keep argument from collapsing into wrangling, and apparently cheerful acceptance of hierarchy. Even with these flaws, Arendt describes something we would do well to consider thoughtfully: a fact-based but not positivist, communally grounded but not relativist, adversarial but not violent, independent but not expressivist rhetoric.

### Gendered Language

#### Link: They said “you guys” before the 2AC

**Even though their use of gendered nouns has been generally accepted reject them – they still reflect gendered language**

**UNC 2007** (“ Gender-Sensitive Language ” <http://www.unc.edu/depts/wcweb/handouts/gender.html>)

Like gendered pronouns, gendered nouns can also provide a stumbling block for the gender-savvy writer. The best way to avoid implications these words can carry is simply to be aware of how we tend to use them in speech and writing. Because gendered nouns are so commonly used and accepted by English writers and speakers, we often don't notice them or the implications they bring with them. Once you've recognized that a gender distinction is being made by such a word, though, conversion of the gendered noun into a gender-savvy one is usually very simple.

"Man" and words ending in "-man" are the most commonly used gendered nouns, so avoiding the confusion they bring can be as simple as watching out for these words and replacing them with words that convey your meaning more effectively. For example, if the founders of America had been gender-savvy writers, they might have written " . . . all people are created equal" instead of " . . . all men are created equal . . .."

Another common gendered expression, particularly in informal speech and writing, is "you guys." This expression is used to refer to groups of men, groups of women, and groups that include both men and women. Although most people mean to be inclusive when they use "you guys," this phrase wouldn't make sense if it didn't subsume women under the category "guys." To see why "you guys" is gendered male, consider that "a guy" (singular) is definitely a man, not a woman, and that most men would not feel included in the expression "you gals" or "you girls."

**Reject their language even if it’s commonplace – their insidious form of gendered language reinforces a system in which men are privileged over women – discourse can either uphold the flawed status quo or open the possibility of a new reality – vote for a new, inclusive language**

**Kleinman 2007** - teaches in the Department of Sociology at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill (March 12, Sherryl, “ Why Sexist Language Matters ” http://www.alternet.org/story/48856/?page=entire)

I'm not referring to such words as "bitch," "whore" and "slut." What I focus on instead are words that students consider just fine: male (so-called) generics. Some of these words refer to persons occupying a position: postman, chairman, freshman, congressman, fireman. Other words refer to the entire universe of human beings: "mankind" or "he." Then we've got manpower, manmade lakes and "Oh, man, where did I leave my keys?" There's "manning" the tables in a country where children learn that "all men are created equal." The most insidious, from my observations, is the popular expression "you guys." Please don't tell me it's a regional term. I've heard it in the Triangle, New York, Chicago, San Francisco and Montreal. I've seen it in print in national magazines, newsletters and books. And even if it were regional, that doesn't make it right. I'll bet we can all think of a lot of practices in our home regions that we'd like to get rid of. I sound defensive. I know. But that's because I've so often heard (and not only from students) ... What's the big deal? Why does all this "man-ning" and "guys-ing" deserve a place in my list of items of gender inequality and justify taking up inches of space in the newsletter of a rape crisis center? Because male-based generics are another indicator -- and more importantly, a reinforcer -- of a system in which "man" in the abstract and men in the flesh are privileged over women. Some say that language merely reflects reality and so we should ignore our words and work on changing the unequal gender arrangements that are reflected in our language. Well, yes, in part. It's no accident that "man" is the anchor in our language and "woman" is not. And of course we should make social change all over the place. But the words we use can also reinforce current realities when they are sexist (or racist or heterosexist). Words are tools of thought. We can use words to maintain the status quo or to think in new ways -- which in turn creates the possibility of a new reality. It makes a difference if I think of myself as a "girl" or a "woman"; it makes a difference if we talk about "Negroes" or "African-Americans." Do we want a truly inclusive language or one that just pretends?

## Indefinite Detention Good

And, Al-Qaedastyle terror shifts the calculations about preventative detention – one person can kill thousands, normal assumptions about detention don’t apply

Schied, 10 (Apr 7, Don E., *Indefinite Detention of Mega-terrorists in the War on Terror*, Criminal Justice Ethics, 29:1, 1-28, DOI: 10.1080/0711291003654146)

One standard objection to preventive detentions of any kind is that it is very difficult to predict a person’s future behavior. It is notoriously difficult to predict who will commit a violent crime, for example. Using current methods of criminology, it is said that there would be at least one ‘‘false positive’’ for every ‘‘true positive’’; that is, at least one person who would never commit a future crime would be held in custody for every person correctly held.31 In the context of domestic law, a 50/50 chance that the person in custody would never commit a future crime would seem to be unacceptably high. In defense of preventive detention, it might be pointed out that no system is perfect. Indeed, our system of criminal justice is certainly not perfect, and many innocent persons are mistakenly convicted and incarcerated every year. Nevertheless, the objection continues, the ratio of false convictions to true ones in the criminal- justice system is surely much better than 50/50. Although there do not seem to be any reliable statistics on this, one might reasonably¶ hope that the ratio of false to true convictions would be 10/90 or better. It is often said it is better that ten¶ guilty persons go free than that one innocent person should be punished. 32 An implication sometimes¶ drawn from this maxim is that no one should be punished for a crime¶ Mistakenly punishing an innocent person is obviously a very great harm to that individual (and, indirectly,¶ to family, friends, and associates). 33 It is often thought to clearly outweigh the harm of a guilty person¶ getting off without punishment. The thought is that while the innocent person suffers the harm of punishment,¶ no one suffers any harm when the system fails to punish a guilty person, although retributive justice is¶ not served. Surely, it is argued, it is far worse for John to be falsely convicted and hanged for a murder¶ he did not commit, than for Bill to be mistakenly set free when he really did commit a murder.¶ But should the moral priorities always be this way? Undoubtedly, there can be situations in which the¶ priorities should be the other way around. Michael Corrado offers the following hypothetical example. Imagine a group of 10 people, six of whom will commit murder if allowed to go free; but we do not¶ know which of the 10 they are. If we let them all go free, six innocent people will be murdered. The risk of¶ false positives cannot be our only concern. Surely, the prospect that four innocent persons will lose their¶ freedom must be weighed against the prospect that six other innocent persons will lose their lives.34¶ In the case of mega-terrorism, all the calculations about preventive detention shift radically. This is simply because the dangers threatened are so much greater. One mega-terrorist might easily represent the deaths of hundreds or even thousands of people. In these circumstances, mistakenly releasing a mega-terrorist would be far more serious than mistakenly detaining an innocent non-terrorist. Under the threat of mega-terrorism, it would seem that the maxim should go the other way: better that 10 innocents be detained than that one mega-terrorist go free.

And – if it’s a moral question, detention should be proportional to the danger it contains and no more – 1AC misses the point - the problem isn’t detention, its torture, the two aren’t the same

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One consequence of preventive detention that some may find surprising is that the conditions of detention¶ may be no more burdensome than absolutely necessary. In theory, if not always in practice, a sharp distinction is made between punishment for past wrongs and detention to prevent future wrongs. The rationales for the two are very different. Criminal desert arises from past wrongdoing, whereas dangerousness is estimated future wrongdoing. For instance, the mentally ill person may be civilly¶ committed because of the danger she presents to others, but the person is entirely innocent from the point of view of the criminal law and does not deserve punishment. The confinement may be characterized as ‘‘innocent detention.’’ Since the person is being held for society’s benefit, rather than as deserved punishment, the conditions of confinement should be no more onerous for the individual than necessary to fulfill society’s need for public safety. Thus, like the quarantine confinement of a person with a contagious disease, the person should be held in the least intrusive way possible. In some cases, this may mean full-time incarceration; but in many others, confinement may require only a ‘‘half-way house’’ or home detention with an ankle bracelet. Once the danger the person poses is contained, no greater levels of restraint can be justified for reasons of preventive detention.5